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I. TRADITIONAL AND MODERN STATES 
Successful warfare is a matter of social organization not of superior                               
weapons.1 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
It is commonly held that the military forces of a modern Western society are 
reflections of that society.  The organization, manning and equipping of these forces are 
derived from what is prevalent and acceptable to the society and culture that generates the 
military forces.  This belief has even been projected backwards.  It is hard to argue that a 
society organized around feudalism created a specific type of warfare and organization of 
forces.  Nor is it difficult to understand how the French Revolution propelled Dynastic 
Warfare toward the mass warfare of the twentieth century.  However, this line of thought 
tends to breakdown when one discusses how pre-state or devolving societies build and 
employ military forces.  In these cases we tend to view not only the pre-state or 
devolving societal organization, but also their military forces through the prism of 
modern Western concepts of the state, bureaucracy, and military organization. As Ken 
Booth states in Strategy and Ethnocentrism,   
Western liberal ideas about the utility of military force cannot be safely 
projected onto other societies.  Ideas about the usability of force are 
always likely to decline most amongst those with nuclear overkill, settled 
frontiers, a horror of violence, vivid memories of total wars and a reduced 
need project force beyond their own frontiers.  But these conditions do not 
pertain outside the Western world:  more traditional outlooks persist.  
Western observers project their own attitudes in another way.  There is a 
familiar Western penchant for adopting patronizing attitudes toward less 
developed societies…2  
The result of these cultural views is that Western theorists tend to overlook the inherent 
strengths of a pre-state or devolving society, as all that is seen to the Western eye is 
anarchy and despotic rule. 
                                                 
1 Harry Holbert Turney-High, Primative War Its Practice and Concepts.  (Columbia:  University of 
South Carolina Press, 1971) 
2 Ken Booth,  Strategy and Ethnocentrism.  (New York:  Holmes and Meier Publishers Inc, 1979).  77.  
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 Today while the developed world moves toward increasing technological 
sophistication and societal integration, the developing world has little chance of even 
attaining the current level of western technological sophistication.  A result is the 
developing world is not only retrenching from the state system, which was imposed on it 
as a product of de-colonization, but also rejecting western social development. The 
developing world’s retrenchment from the state system has a large impact on relations 
between states and societies that are devolving away from western models.  The main 
challenge to western states will be how these devolving societies and their military forces 
interact with modern states within the prevalent state system.  Specifically, this thesis will 
examine the relationship between devolved societies and their military organization and 
the modern security system.  It is important to understand not only the military 
organization, but also its parent society in order to understand the dynamics that are 
driving the creation of a new warfare paradigm. Devolving societies and military 
organizations are difficult to understand and defeat.  While this is an examination of the 
military implications of what I call hybrid societies, it is recognized that the use of the 
military is just one aspect of a multi-dimensional strategy that must be developed to 
address the security issues stemming from hybrid societies.      
B.  CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 
There is increasingly a body of work that is challenging the accepted norm of 
peaceful pre-state societies that turned violent only as higher and more centralized forms 
of societal organization became prevalent.  However, no substantive research has applied 
these theories of highly violent and warlike pre-state society to the current devolution of 
states.  Devolving societies are societies that are returning to more traditional forms of 
organization, but are doing so unevenly.  That is, these societies are bringing with them 
an eclectic mix of modern technology as well as political and religious theory and 
institutions as they devolve.  These hybrid societies, as part of their devolution, appear to 
have adopted war in the context of Harry Holbert Turney-High, who saw primitive war, 
“…as a social institution that served a variety of functions.  Not only could war be 
useful…but it was an exciting diversion.”3  These societies, many of which retain the 
                                                 
3 Lawrence H. Keely, War before Civilization.  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1996).  10. 
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trappings of the state system, are either a multitude of warring clans contained within the 
previous state boundaries, or a mostly homogenous socio-political unit that is fighting 
against a perceived oppressor.  In either case these hybrid societies are a mixture of the 
modern and the traditional.  Hybrid societies in turn have organized hybrid military 
forces, and it is these forces that will challenge military and diplomatic planners in the 
future. 
Currently a large body of work exists regarding hybrid military forces under the 
rubric of Fourth Generation Warfare, New Warfare, or more conventional terms such as 
Low Intensity Conflict and Terrorism.4  Fourth Generation Warfare coined by Bill Lind 
and others in the late 1980’s saw warfare in non-states as developing along a divergent 
path when compared to that being developed by Western nations.  The developed world 
is increasingly moving toward “Advanced Technology” warfare, which will embed the 
increasing reliance on high technology seen Western society in Western military forces.  
Countering this in non-western states, and especially hybrid societies, is an increasing 
shift toward an idea driven concept of war.  This idea driven concept of war, also called 
the “Terrorist/LIC” form of warfare by Robert J. Bunker, envisions a mix of terrorism 
and Low Intensity Conflict that is non-national or transnational in nature, and bypasses 
the western military to directly attack western cultural.  Fourth Generation Warfare will 
attempt to attack the west from within and is consistent with the non-Trinitarian style of 
warfare described by Martin Van Creveld in the Transformation of War.5   
Essays on Fourth Generation Warfare deal mainly with the strategy, tactics, and 
organization of the forces coming from devolving societies and superficially address the 
genesis of these forces.  Mary Kaldor’s book, New and Old Wars, Organized Violence in 
a Global Era, looks at the issue from the opposite side.  She discusses how the 
breakdown of society through globalization, the “breaking up of the cultural and socio-
economic divisions that defined the patterns of politics…[in] the modern period,” and the 
                                                 
4 Also called Post Modern Warfare by Chris Hable Grey;  Degenerate Warfare by Martin Shaw. 
5 William Lind, Col. Keith F. Nightengale, Capt John F. Schmitt, Col Joseph W. Sutton, Lt Col Gary I. 
Wilson, “The Changing Face of War:  Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette.  October 1989, 
Vol 73, #10.  22-26. 
Robert J. Bunker, “Transitions to Fourth Epoch Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette.  September 1994, 
Vol 78, #9.  20-34. 
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removal of Cold War blocs have at once increased the pressure on fragile societies 
through the increasingly global environment while removing the pressure of governments 
to conform in a bi-polar global system.  Her “New War” model sees in modern wars the 
“blurring of the distinctions between war, organized crime, and large scale violations of 
human rights.”  She also sees the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) as a revolution in 
“the social relations of warfare, not in technology, even though changes in social 
relations are influenced by and make use of technology.”  However, little is said in the 
discussion of future warfare on the relation between hybrid and pre-state societies, and 
how the devolution of modern society toward pre-state society affects not only social 
relations but also military organization and theory. 6   
Since culture impacts on war we must understand a society’s culture to 
understand its profession of arms.  As Ken Booth relates, 
Unless we attempt to understand the character of different cultures it will 
be impossible to appreciate the mainsprings of National Strategies.  
Without knowing about the pride, prestige or prejudice, moral outrage, 
insistence on survival, vanity, vengeance of different societies how can we 
begin to appreciate the roles, which such important peoples…might play 
in contemporary and future military problems.7 
The intention of this thesis is to establish the links between hybrid societies, hybrid 
warfare and pre-state societies and warfare by examining both pre-state and modern 
societies and military organizations.  This will establish for the hybrid society what is 
already accepted for modern ones, namely that military organization is derived from 
social organization.  Studying the Chechen insurgency will examine these linkages and 
how the confluence of modern political theory, technology, and a devolving society 
creates a unique form of warfare.  Finally, the implications of hybrid warfare vis a vis 
Western society will be assessed.  The conclusion will delineate the implications that 
hybrid warfare has on western states and provide recommendations on adapting the 
current military forces to more effectively counter the threat. 
 
                                                 
6 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era.  (Cambridge:  Polity Press, 
1999). 70; Ibid, 3; Ibid, 2. 
7 Booth, 144. 
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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In order to determine how devolving societies will organize their military forces 
and conduct warfare it is essential that a general understanding of pre-state society and 
warfare be developed.  A general view of pre-state society will provide an understanding 
of the underlying strengths and weaknesses of societies organized around the tribe, clan 
or chiefdom.  This organization is important because modernity seems to be 
strengthening ethnic or tribal affinity, which becomes a factor in the breakdown of the 
state.  The increasing dislocation brought about by globalization enhances the drive 
toward ethnic or tribal affinity.  This erosion of state control creates space in which 
groups with particularistic views gain power and push an exclusive agenda.  The leaders 
of these groups, operating outside the envelope of state control, organize paramilitary 
forces to fight against the remaining state power and work from below to diminish state 
power.  The end of the Cold War has exasperated these tendencies by removing the need 
to keep developing areas under control and in one’s sphere.  The benign neglect of the 
developing world resulting from the end of the super power competition has increased the 
corrosive effects of globalism and warlordism in the developing world. 
The forces organized by ethnic or tribal leaders are nominally loyal to him, the 
warlord, and thrive in the lawlessness created by the vacuum of state control.  It is this 
devolution of society and its concomitant anarchic military organization and goals that is 
the future threat against which western society must organize its military forces to 
counter.    
To understand the basis of the identity of these devolved societies and their 
inherent difference from western society an overview of pre-state and modern societies as 
well as an overview of pre-state and modern military organization and operations will be 
conducted. 
B.  SOCIETY 
1.  Pre-State Society 
 5
No dissection of military organization and operations can be conducted without 
understanding the societal context from which the military is drawn.  According to Keith 
Otterbein, “Military organizations…are viewed as a particular type of social organization.  
Like any organization they have a social structure consisting of a character and norms.”8  
Having established that military organization is similar to other societal organizations he 
then goes on to say, 
Organizations, including military organizations, since they are articulated 
within the larger social system of the political community have an 
influence upon and in turn are influenced by the larger social system.9 
In the conclusion of the book Otterbein draws the links starkly. “As a political 
community evolves in terms of increasing centralization, the more evolved the manner of 
waging war.”10  Otterbein is directly linking the socio-political sophistication of society 
with military sophistication regardless of the era.  Hence the military organization of a 
state, chiefdom, or tribe will reflect the sophistication of its related social organization, 
whether in the modern, feudal, or pre-state era. 
 While an exhaustive study on pre-state society is beyond the scope of this thesis 
the general characteristics common to traditional and modern societies will be developed 
and the linkages to each society’s military organization established to illustrate Otterbein’ 
assertions. 
a.  Culture 
The view of pre-state society has been influenced by two of the great 
philosophers on the human condition, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  
Hobbes, writing in Leviathan, states that if all men are equal because they were endowed 
with will and prudence equally they would eventually come into conflict, and this conflict 
would be over items that only one could possess.  The result of the conflict would be that 
one man would defeat or subjugate the other in pursuit of possession.  From this concept 
Hobbes extrapolates that the natural condition of man as being “War of every man 
against every man.”  To avoid this anarchy man would agree to surrender his liberty for 
                                                 
8 Keith F. Otterbein, The Evolution of War.  (HARF Press:  1970) 4. 
9 Ibid, 4. 
10 Ibid, 105-106. 
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protection from a centralizing authority.  This authority, commonly viewed as the state, 
while preparing for and fighting wars, “organized havens of peace within each state.” 
Hobbes’s view is contrasted with primitive society in which he saw no “havens of peace” 
preserved. 11   
Rousseau, like Hobbes, saw in primitive society an innate equality.  
However where Hobbes saw raw emotions leading to eventual domination Rousseau saw, 
“Any tendency toward violence in the natural condition…suppressed by human’s innate 
pity or compassion.”12  Furthermore where Hobbes saw the creation of centralizing 
authority as contributing to peace and stability, Rousseau saw civil society and 
centralized authority as causing the creation of separate societies as well as artificial laws.  
These factors, in Rousseau’s view, drove modern society to become more warlike.  For 
most of the twentieth century Rousseau’s view of a peaceful primitive society was 
accepted as accurate.  However, by the latter decades of the century the works of Keith F. 
Otterbein and Lawrence Keely were challenging this assumption.  These authors have 
begun to counter the assertion that primitive society was peaceful and unmilitaristic, and 
while not as bleak as Hobbesian views saw a violent anarchic world in pre-state society. 
  It has been commonly understood that pre-state warfare differs from that 
conducted by modern states.  However, this warfare has until recently, been viewed 
through the lens of modern Western concepts of warfare.  Both Quincy Wright and Harry 
Holbert Turney-High, the preeminent twentieth century scholars on primitive warfare, 
declared pre-state warfare to be defective when compared to civilized warfare.13  In 
actuality, primitive or pre-state warfare, which tactically is remarkably similar to guerrilla 
warfare, is not defective.  However, when both are viewed from a modern, western 
perspective they appear anarchic and hence ineffective and defective.   
The foundations of primitive culture are seen to be an egalitarian society, 
based on custom, traditions and high levels of violence.  While this seems contradictory 
                                                 
11 Keely, 5; Ibid, 6. 
12 Ibid, 6. 
13 Quincy Wright,  A Study of War Vol 1.  (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1964).  80-85. 
     Turney-High, Primative War Its Practice and Concepts.   
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upon closer examination there is a strong link between an egalitarian society and high 
levels of violence.  The main factor for this is the inability of the informal headman, 
council of elders, or elected war chiefs to impose subordination.   
Attempts to punish…a warrior in an egalitarian society would be 
foolhardy and disruptive, since the culprit would have the support of 
kinsman in resisting or retaliating for such abuse.14   
An attempt at creating a hierarchical system, then, would lead to internal feuds and a 
weakening of the pre-state socio-political unit.   
With regards to the level of violence, most modern anthropologists 
viewing primitive societies have concluded, “tribesmen conducted a more stylized, less 
horrible form of warfare,” by viewing the rare primitive battles.  These rare battles were 
correctly observed as highly ritualistic with the result being that few casualties resulted 
from them. Battles gave observers the impression that, “Primitive warfare was not very 
risky.”15  Primitive warfare, when viewed through the Western prism of the preeminence 
of battle, is decidedly less violent than its modern equivalent.  However, when one views 
primitive combat in its more common forms; ambushes, raids, and attacks on villages, 
one sees not only the frequency of combat increasing, but also the level of casualties.  
These more common forms of combat create a vision of pre-state society in which 
violence was a “…frequent and…a latent condition of pre-state existence.”16  What in the 
organization of pre-state societies leads them to become egalitarian yet violent?  Looking 
at the structure of pre-state societies gives us an indication of how this might happen. 
b. Structure 
The structure of pre-state societies can be broadly broken into two groups, 
the first being tribes without rulers and the second tribes with rulers.  According to 
Martin Van Creveld, tribes without rulers “both began and ended within the extended 
family lineage or clan,” and further, “all social relations that went beyond simple 
friendship were defined exclusively in terms of kin.”17  Lawrence Keely likewise 
                                                 
14 Keely, 43. 
15 Ibid, 9. 
16 Ibid, 16. 
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17 Martin Van Crevald, The Rise and Decline of the State. (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
identifies the structure of pre-state society as based on kin.  To Keely tribes are 
associations, which are “usually kin groups [and] …In most cases there is no central 
political organization except informal councils of elders or local chiefs.”  The difference 
between the two authors is mainly one of organization.  Keely breaks out the difference 
between band, clans, tribes, but then later states “Primarily for stylistic reasons these 
terms are used interchangeably.”18  Keely’s statement indicates the differences between 
the two authors is mainly semantic and has little to do with the conclusion that these 
social organizations were based on familial ties and possessed an informal style of 
leadership.  Societies organized around the extended family with temporary or elder 
leadership were bound to be egalitarian in nature.  
 In the absence of any institutional authority except that within the 
extended family the societies in question were egalitarian and democratic.  
Every adult male was considered, and considered himself, the equal of all 
others; nobody had the right to issue orders to, express justice over, or 
demand payment from anybody else.19 
The North American Plains Indians are an example of this type of society.  
The elders that oversaw tribes without rulers had little power to enforce compliance 
leading to personal jealousies and agendas that could drag the whole tribe into what 
amounted to a personal conflict.  Likewise, tribe members could split off from the kin 
group or, in what is commonplace today, continue fighting even though the tribal leaders 
wanted peace.  Tribes without rulers were composed of family peer groups.  While 
without a doubt, a hierarchical structure was present within families, the equality between 
families in the kin group made decision-making and implementation problematic.  
Overall the structure of pre-state society could be rather amorphous.  The strengths of the 
tribe relied on its chief’s ability to satisfy his kin groups through victory in war, creating 
agricultural surplus, and his ability to impress his kin group with his magical powers.  At 
any point, if his charisma or magic failed, he could be replaced.   
                                                 
1999).  2. 
18 Keely 26-27. 
19 Van Crevald, 14.  Emphasis his. 
 9
  At the next level of sophistication are tribes with rulers, also known as 
chiefdoms.  Here Van Creveld and Keely disagree over the institutionalization of 
leadership, but not the structure of a chiefdom.  Both authors view Chiefdoms as larger 
than tribes, possibly having a population of several to tens of thousands.  Leading this 
organization was a chief whose job was to create a cadre of professional warriors.  The 
creation of this cadre was made possible by the chief’s control over the economic life of 
his people, and his ability to redistribute economic surpluses.  However, Van Creveld and 
Keely disagree over the mechanics of the Chiefdom’s succession of leaders.  Specifically, 
they differ over the role of hereditary rights to leadership and demonstrated military 
prowess play in selecting a new leader.  Van Creveld sees leaders as ruling by divine 
right, although being a successful political and economic leader was more important than 
hereditary right.  Keely, while also agreeing that chiefs ruled by divine right places the 
emphasis on the hereditary transfer of authority.20  However, both agree that the chief, 
“unlike a king, does not have the power to coerce people into obedience physically; 
instead he must rely on magical and economic powers.”21  Chiefdoms were exceedingly 
prevalent throughout the world, and included societies throughout Europe, Asia, and the 
Pacific Rim to include the Pacific North West coast of North America.  The modern 
incarnation of chiefdoms is in the various warlords that have arisen in developing 
societies.  The essential difference is the modern warlord is usually powerfully armed and 
able to physically coerce people into obedience.   
  Outside of family-clan links, the other characteristics defining pre-state 
society was common ownership of tribal resources such as land, water, animals, and the 
common raising of the youth.  Common ownership implies common management, and 
here we again see how pre-state society was egalitarian.  If every clan member had a 
stake in the clan’s resources he must also have a say in the management of those 
resources.  However, on occasion the concept of equality would breakdown and respect 
for the rights of others would suffer.  In societies without a legal system or law 
enforcement capabilities, traditions developed from tribal and religious custom that acted 
                                                 
20 Keely, 26-27; Van Crevald, 10-12. 
21 Keely, 27. 
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as the moral basis of the society.22  Committing crimes could result in intratribal fighting 
or feuding.  When the traditions, which formed the moral basis of society, were violated, 
the tribal and religious leaders would attempt to mediate a resolution to the injustice. 
Vengeance would be gained through feuding, if mediation proved impossible.       
  Vengeance, for unmediated crimes, was received through the blood feud. 
Commonly viewed as an internecine struggle that disrupted society, in actuality blood 
feuds were a technique used to seek vengeance while limiting the feud and saving the 
integrity of the tribe.  Christopher Boehm describes feuding as “deliberate social 
engineering” that contains two critical elements of conflict management, “the deliberate 
limitation of conflict and a deliberate attempt to resolve the conflict.”  Feuding overseen 
by tribal or religious leaders was seen as “Socially disruptious, but also socially 
integrative…particularly as a practical alternative to warfare at close quarter.” Controlled 
resolution, whether through mediation by priest or tribal elders, paying compensation for 
the injustice or through revenge, was essential to ensure tribal survival.  While not always 
feasible, efforts at resolution below the level of revenge were attempted.  However, 
recourse to the feud, controlled as it was by custom, was viewed, “as a moral necessity… 
if a descent social status was to be maintained.” 23  
c.  Economy 
While the majority of egalitarian societies were agrarian, a few were 
nomadic hunting bands, and most lived at or near the subsistence level.  Tribes without 
rulers whether nomadic or sedentary were especially susceptible to this as no appointed 
leader had the authority to impose a system that could create and redistribute excess.  
Without this capability it was impossible to dedicate segments of society to unproductive 
labor such as the defense of the socio-political unit.  Living near the subsistence level, 
tribes without rulers had limited opportunity to engage in long term campaigning nor did 
they have the capability to organize standing military forces or provide for a cadre of 
professional warriors, as all hands were needed to ensure the survival of the family and 
                                                 
22 Van Crevald, 4. 
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the tribe.  Keely makes this point when he states “…society’s economy may not be 
sustained if it is denuded of men to hunt, tend stock, clean gardens.”24   
Militarily, the result of not having a standing military or protection force 
was that every male was trained as a warrior, again leading to the fact that an egalitarian 
society could be especially violent.  In pre-state society, instead of long-term campaigns 
what was seen was a series of short-lived expeditions each with a discreet purpose and 
conducted over a lengthy period.  These expeditions were conducted during periods that 
were beneficial to the tribe’s survival and are analogous to the campaigning seasons 
common in warfare from the medieval period until the latter nineteenth century.   
Additionally, the fragilities of clan leadership, with peers or elders 
appointed as the clan leader, made prosecuting war uncertain.  Already alluded to is the 
fact that the decentralized society allowed for personal vendettas that could quickly 
subsume a whole clan in fighting another clan.  Van Creveld, sounding similar to Turney-
High, addresses this, “In the absence of a centralized decision-making body war itself 
might be defined less as a deliberate political act than as a characteristic activity of adult 
males.”25  It is only as clan based societies begin to develop into chiefdoms or city-states 
that we see the leadership develop to enable the specialization of labor, the creation of 
excess production, a system of taxation and redistribution, and the ability to organize a 
cadre of trained warriors.  These warriors were supported by the chiefdom’s excess 
production and traded military prowess, and the protection of the chiefdom, for economic 
support from the chiefdom. The advent of trained warriors and surplus production 
allowed the leaders of chiefdom’s to carry out more extensive and wide-ranging warfare.  
An example of this is the evolution of Zulu warfare, which became increasingly capable 
as Zulu society became controlled by an increasingly centralized and specialized 
leadership stratum.  As Otterbein describes it, “[In Zulu society] Dueling battles occurred 
at the tribal level, battles of subjugation led to the development of chiefdoms, battles of 
conquest brought about the emergence of the state.”26   
                                                 
24 Keely 34-35. 
25 Van Crevald, 7. 
26 Keith F. Otterbein, “The evolution of Zulu Warfare,”  Feuding and Warfare:  War and Society Vol 
1.  (Canada:  Gordon and Breach, 1997).  29-30. 
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In summary, clan based pre-state societies share the general characteristics 
of egalitarianism, common ownership, strong family ties, weak leaders who lacked an 
ability to force compliance with their decisions, subsistence existence, moral and legal 
control based on traditions, which are combinations of tribal custom, magic, religion.  A 
high level of daily violence further characterizes these societies because they were an 
armed society without strong leaders in which intra-clan feuding and inter-clan warfare 
were prominent. 
2.  Modern Society  
The characteristics of modern society should be apparent to all contemporary 
people.  However, what is unique about modern society in relation to pre-state society?  
At its heart, is not modern society an outgrowth of pre-state-society?  We are all 
accustomed to the fact that the military forces of a modern society are a reflection of that 
society.  More importantly, the way we view and conduct war is equally a reflection of a 
given state’s individual society, and the increasingly close-knit global society.   
One point is inescapable regarding wars.  Rather than being a destructive force as 
commonly viewed, war has been the key element in the consolidation of tribal units into 
chiefdoms, chiefdoms into city-states, and then into early states.   
Modern warfare, by upsetting the equilibrium of traditional society with 
its emphasis on local autonomy and privilege paved the way for a steady 
increase in state power and military might.27 
A non-western example of this phenomenon is Keith Otterbein’s analysis of Zulu societal 
development and its implications for military organization and strategy looked at earlier. 
Bruce Porter sees war as essential to the transformation of pre-state society into 
modern society.  Wars have resulted in the territorial coalescence of states.  As an 
example, fourteenth century Europe was composed of approximately a thousand separate 
political entities.  By the sixteenth century five hundred of these remained, by the time of 
the French Revolution under three hundred and fifty existed, and by the beginning of the 
twentieth century only twenty-five remained.28   
                                                 
27 Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics.  (New 
York:  The Free Press, 1994).  297. 
28 Mark Greengrass, ed., Conquest and Coalescence:  The Shaping of the State in Early Modern 
Europe.  (London:  Edward Arnold, 1991).  1-2.  
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Wars gave rulers both the incentive and the opportunity to concentrate 
power—and that power was the force that ultimately overcame the 
fragmentation of society.29 
The territorial extent of the nascent state increased through war, and war, by 
breaking down existing social and political barriers between tribes and clans, had an 
integrative and socializing effect on the disparate peoples brought under the control of the 
state.  Control was extended through state provided services such as education, 
transportation, and medical care, and through the creation of a national army.  Finally, the 
military could be used to forcibly assimilate sections of the state that attempted to retain 
their autonomy.  The increased span of state control was essential to the development of 
the nation within the boundaries of the state.  So much so that, according to Bruce Porter, 
“The quickest way to make a nation is to make an army.”30  Martin Van Creveld sees 
state formation in a more Hobbsian way.  He states, “…the state was originally conceived 
principally as an instrument of imposing law and order on groups and people.”31  Rather 
than having a socializing effect Van Creveld sees state consolidation through the physical 
dominance of the center over its periphery.   
a.  Culture 
Whereas Hobbes accurately described the true face of pre-state society, 
Rousseau and his fellow philsophes constructed the foundations of what would become 
the modern liberal state.  The enlightenment is generally viewed as the essential 
philosophical break between the early state, and pre-state society.  The enlightenment’s 
effects on Western society are also widely thought to provide a philosophical 
underpinning for the success of the state in western society, and its absence in other areas 
of the world a key reason why the liberal state has not been embraced or codified there.  
Post enlightenment citizens began to rise up, not against the state, but rather against the 
dynastic leadership to gain an increased level of participation in government.  This act 
began to reverse the trend, present since early chiefdoms that took power away from the 
people toward rulers and ruling classes.  Only at the turn of the nineteenth century do we 
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begin to see the return toward the democracy that was prevalent in pre-state society.  This 
return was not complete, however, as the structure of society had evolved.   
b.  Structure 
The most graphic difference between pre-state and modern society is its 
structure.  The modern Western state, while democratic in a more ritualistic manner is 
organized in a hierarchically.  To be efficient this hierarchical state must have strong 
leadership and a bureaucracy capable of translating the strong leadership into political 
and military power abroad and implement social and economic development 
domestically.   
In order to wield both the civilian and military aspects of …power, they 
[rulers] set out to construct an impersonal bureaucracy as well as the tax 
and information infrastructure necessary of its support.  Once the 
bureaucracy was in place its own nature-the fact that the rules of which it 
was consisted could not be arbitrarily violated without risking a 
breakdown… 32 
Van Creveld discusses the essence of the structural differences above.   
As chiefdoms developed into larger, territorial based units, and as egalitarian leadership 
turned toward an autocratic, dynastic form, these strong leaders could not personally 
manage the enlarged early state.  By creating a bureaucracy and a civil service class the 
ruler could now manage the enlarged state.  However, the bureaucracy diffused the 
ruler’s power, and the increasing bureaucratization of the state created a need to establish 
legal foundations on which the bureaucracy could operate.  This move toward a 
government and society based on the rule of law further weakened the dynastic rulers 
claim to rule by divine right.   
The state’s existence is grounded in the development of law, and has 
become a legal entity.  This legal stature gives the state the right and the bureaucracy the 
ability to monopolize the use of force, both internally and externally.  As such, modern 
states with public input, make laws that govern daily life and create the bureaucratic 
mechanisms through law enforcement and the judicial process whereby disputes and the 
breakdown of society’s moral basis can be regulated. Essentially, as man evolved from 
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pre-state society to a modern state based society, he transferred his personal sovereignty 
first to leaders who ruled by divine right and later to the institution of the states in return 
for safety and increased prosperity.  Van Creveld sees the legal characteristics of the 
modern state as interacting in the following way: 
First being sovereign, it refuses to share any…functions with others but 
concentrates them in its own hands.  Secondly, being territorial it exercises 
such powers over all the people who live within its borders and over them 
only.  Thirdly, and most importantly, it is an abstract organization.  Unlike 
any of it predecessors at any other time and place, it is not identical with 
either rulers nor ruled; it is neither a man nor a community, but an 
invisible being known as a corporation.33  
The states strong leadership exercised through the bureaucracy prevents 
independent actions by individuals against states.  The concept of vengeance is attenuated 
within society via the bureaucratic mechanism of law enforcement, and between socio-
political units, is removed through international conventions, which allow only states to 
prepare for, declare, and conduct war.  This centralization of society has lessened the 
number or inter-political unit conflicts, but not their destructiveness. 
The bureaucratization of government and society has removed an added 
pressure that drove pre-state societies toward frequent combat.  In a modern state not all 
its citizens are trained for war.  The specialization of labor diffuses the warrior ethos, and 
the increasing technical sophistication and integration of society make those skilled in 
diplomacy, economics, and industry almost, if not, more important to the security and 
safety of society than the warrior. 
c.  Economics 
The economy of modern western society is the second major difference 
that has brought about drastic cultural changes.  The economy of modern states is based 
on industrial production, services, trade, and information technology.34  Modern 
economies are based on surplus production achieved through the exploitation of natural 
resources, technology, the specialization of labor, and trade. A result of surplus 
production and specialization of labor is trade between states and dedicating segments of 
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society to non-subsistence yet essential labor.  These factors created higher standards of 
living allowing for the creation of surplus population.  The combining of surplus 
production and population with non-subsistence labor allowed the states to create police 
forces to maintain domestic order and military forces to protect society from external 
threats as well as expand the territorial extent of the state.  The establishment of these 
police and military forces entailed the development of a bureaucracy to administer them 
and manage the government tax receipts and expenditures required to support them.  This 
relationship between government services, government expenditures, and the bureaucracy 
shows how interrelated the state, society and the economy were becoming, even in the 
early days of the state.   
What is unique in the modern state is the level to which the government, 
economy, and society are integrated and benefit mutually from this.  The state benefits 
from increased control and power created by the bureaucracy and economic strength; the 
economy benefits through government protection, regulation, and the creation of a 
healthy, literate society; and society benefits through state social programs and economic 
well being gained from the strong economy.  Bruce Porter twists these links together into 
what he calls the “collectivist state.” 
This new form of the modern state was really three states intertwined into 
one:  a regulatory state, characterized by extensive state intervention in 
the national economy; a mass state, in which political participation and 
privilege were divorced from class or economic status; and a welfare state, 
assuming direct responsibility for the well-being of its citizens.35 
The characteristics of the modern state can be said to be centralization and 
the creation of hierarchical structures, and a bureaucracy through which strong leadership 
is exercised.  The leadership seen in a state is codified in the rule of law.  The state is 
sovereign and its leadership controls the legal means of coercion.  The government of the 
state maintains tight control, both through its organs and its relations with other states and 
international organizations over the decision to go to war.  As a result wars are less 
frequent, but more deadly. 
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B.  MILITARY 
Since military organization is drawn from the organization of society as a whole it 
is not possible to envision the emergence of a hierarchical or a national military force 
from an egalitarian, clan based social structure.  Likewise, if the social leadership rules 
without an ability to enforce compliance with their wishes, it holds that the military will 
have this weakness as well.  It is easy to see once a society’s social structure and culture 
are understood the generation and organization of military force are more easily 
understood.   
Certainly a smaller, egalitarian society with simple technology and 
subsistence economy has to conduct warfare differently from a modern 
highly organized state with a complex technology and surplus economy.36 
When hybrid military forces are viewed from the modern western perspective of war and 
military organization they appear to be rather ineffective and disorganized.  However, 
forces from hybrid societies have shown an ability to inflict substantial losses and, at 
times, the ability to outlast the punishment received from modern military forces to attain 
a victory.  In order to understand how a hybrid force can accomplish this, the differences 
between a pre-state and a modern military forces needs to be examined. 
1. Pre-State 
The limitations on the effectiveness of pre-state military forces lie in society’s 
social organization.  This limiting factor is termed the “military horizon” by Turney-
High.  The military horizon, the point beyond which pre-state forces cannot reach, is 
created “not upon the adequacy of weapons, but the adequacy of teamwork, organization, 
and command working along certain principals.”37  The military horizon is a concept not 
entirely discredited in the years since it was proposed, and can be seen today as clan-
based societies in the developing world do not appear able to adequately organize and 
provide effective command and control that is responsible to the national leadership.  The 
result is anarchy in sectors of the developing world.  Where Turney-High’s concept is 
increasingly challenged is how effective pre-state societies are when operating under the 
military horizon.  Turney-High makes light of this fact in Primitive War, 
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Furthermore one cannot avoid the suspicion that primitive societies had 
more system to their fighting that they are given credit for in field reports.  
They made some creditable stands against the white man in spite of their 
small populations and simple weapons.38  
However, despite his reservations, he goes on to view primitive warfare from the 
reference point of mid twentieth century principals of war.  Turney-High’s views remain 
in vogue, and today hybrid forces capabilities and effectiveness are similarly 
misunderstood. 
 Countering Turney-High is Lawrence Keely whose main thesis is that Turney-
High and those of his generation overly based their analysis of primitive war on the 
conduct of battles.  While battles are the basis of modern warfare they were not the basis 
of pre-state warfare.  Keely sees pre-state warfare as the antecedent to guerrilla warfare; 
battle is to be avoided and forces rely on the use of raids, ambushes, murders and 
massacres as well as propaganda and deception to counter a stronger enemy.   
Because such battles are the primary goal and most dramatic events of 
modern warfare the eyes of ethnographers were drawn to comparable 
clashes in the tribal societies they studied…ethnographers’ seldom-
analyzed casualties in relation to the small numbers who fought.  
He then goes on to further state, 
The raids, ambushes, and surprise attacks in villages that constitute a 
major component of tribal warfare were seldom observed and paid little 
notice.39 
Keely views pre-state warfare differently.  He views it as effective, but also more 
violent and total than that seen in modern times.  Keely also sees pre-state tactics as 
highly evolved, but limited by societal constraints and abilities.   
a.  Professionalism 
The lack of a professional leadership cadre can be viewed as the biggest 
detriment to the development of a more organized form of pre-state warfare.  
Additionally, no standing leadership cadre meant that military training was conducted at 
the family level creating warriors not soldiers.  Little collective training was conducted as 
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no time could be found in these subsistence level societies, and no means to enforce 
attendance at training sessions existed.  
In the realm of command and control egalitarian societies with elder 
leadership were incapable of ensuring clan members complied with their decisions to 
engage in warfare.  Similarly the military leadership, often elected, had little ability to 
force compliance with their plans or decisions.  The anarchic organization of society 
carried directly over into the military structure, and created a decided lack of discipline, 
which was further exacerbated, by the lack of collective training to create solid units. 
Any punishment for flight of heedlessness was administered, if at all, 
solely by the enemy.  Attempts to punish…a warrior in an egalitarian 
society would be foolhardy and disruptive, since the culprit would have 
the support of kinsmen in resisting or retaliating.40    
Any attempt at imposing discipline would have been counter productive and threatened 
the existence of the tribe or clan as it would lead to a feud that would affect tribal unity as 
the tribe fought its external enemies. 
  Effective leadership could be exercised through leaders that had 
demonstrated success against the enemy, courage in combat, and the ability to provide 
gains to society through war.  The charismatic war leaders were followed, while 
successful, and when success escaped them, like the magic of the elders, their kinsmen 
were not compelled to follow them.  With no systemic method of training or leadership 
cadres warriors with an innate ability to produce success, led their societies in combat.  
The role of the charismatic war leader is today assumed by the rise of the warlord in 
hybrid societies.  Essentially, effective leaders in pre-state societies were born not grown.   
b.  Organization 
The basis for military organization in pre-state societies was the clan.  
Without a standing force or institutionalized training, military organizations would by 
necessity become ad hoc.  Furthermore, in times of conflict it is imperative to organize 
society as a base of support for the soldiers campaigning away from the villages.  Any 
discussion of military organization must also take into account the ability of that society 
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to mobilize, equip, and support the fielded military forces.  In this aspect not only are pre-
state processes defective when compared to modern processes, but defective in general. 
A social organization capable of producing an economic surplus by high 
agriculture, and a means of transporting such food is as necessary for war 
as the invention of tactics.  Without it…campaigns are impossible.41 
Essentially, pre-state forces were tactical organizations and, while pre-state societies had 
strategic goals, they were incapable of organizing and conducting a campaign to 
accomplish the strategic goals. Being a tactical organization they were only capable of 
achieving short-term goals and achieved the strategic goal only by increasing the 
frequency of war and taking a long-term view of victory.   
In a glimpse of the future Lawrence Keely compares primitive war with 
guerrilla warfare.  In doing so he delineates the characteristics of organization and 
operational methods that are similar between pre-state warfare and modern guerrilla 
warfare. 
In the present day the tactics, objectives, and practices typical of primitive 
war survive in civilized contexts under another name:  guerilla warfare.  
Like their tribal counterparts, guerrilla units are part-time, weakly 
disciplined bands of lightly armed volunteers.  They prefer hit-and-run 
raids and ambushes to formal battle, and rely heavily on their mobility, 
excellent intelligence and knowledge of the terrain to exploit the 
advantages of stealth and surprise.42   
c.  Operations 
A key factor in understanding the level of operational ability is the level of 
societal sophistication.  From this base level of organization, education, political 
complexity, and economic strength can be determined the ability of the society to prepare 
for and conduct war.   
Tribal warriors or their recognized leaders conceived and executed plans 
to exactly the degree of elaborateness and sophistication that their social 
organization, cultural proscriptions of leadership, and economic surplus 
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permitted.  In this regard they were no different from civilized soldiers and 
commanders.43 
As stated above and discussed later pre-state societies eschewed battles 
and relied on more devious and safer tactics to bring war to their enemy.  Battles had a 
large potential to inflict horrendous casualties on both warring parties for little gain, and 
were fought in a highly stylized and ritual fashion when unavoidable.  Viewed from this 
perspective pre-state battles were not similar to contemporary battles, but can rather be 
seen as a form of deterrence mixed with the modern tactics of demonstration and 
presence. 
Turney-High’s critique of pre-state warfare centers on their inability to 
develop tactically and elevate the battle to the prominence shown in modern combat.  The 
inability to develop specific laws of war led to his belief that pre-state warfare was 
defective.  Lawrence Keely, on the other hand, views pre-state tactics as not only 
effective but also more appropriate and, over the long term, more violent than modern 
warfare.  Keith Otterbein in “Why the Iroquois Won” sees tribal warfare as modern 
guerrilla warfare’s direct descendent, and views the dominant Eastern North American 
Indian society’s as practicing guerrilla warfare at a high level of complexity.44  
The most common forms of combat employed in pre-state warfare were 
the raid and the ambush.  Raids were conducted through maneuvers to the flanks and rear 
of the enemy’s position, and at times utilized several war parties converging on the 
enemy position from separate routes with the goal being to capture a village, food stores, 
women or children.  Raids were and remain a particularly brutal form of combat.  The 
complexity of the raiding tactics shows a rather high level of military sophistication in 
pre-state society. Often time’s raids would transform into massacres.  Massacres were 
usually the end result of an extended period of combat between clans and had the effect 
of destroying one social unit and absorbing the remaining members into the dominant 
clan.  Supporting the two main tactics were an extensive use of ruses and deception.     
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Pre-state combat made little distinction between sex and age, and these 
intertribal conflicts had few rules, outside of formal battles, and, unlike feuding, there 
was little attempt at mediation to avoid combat.   Women and children were just as likely 
to be killed as the men.  However, the former were usually killed only after their men had 
been defeated or attrited through prolonged campaigns that left the clans’ villages 
defenseless.  In this instance pre-state warfare was total, and the ultimate goal was the 
destruction, occupation, and assimilation of the enemy’s territory and people.   
Besides leadership the other outstanding weakness of pre-state military 
forces was logistics.  A pre-state warrior essentially provided for himself during combat.  
Along with supplying his weapon the warrior would bring “iron rations” on his person 
sufficient for three days.  When this was consumed, it was necessary to live off the land 
of the enemy.45  No system of organized supply existed simply because pre-state society 
existed near the subsistence level.   
Overall the operational deficiencies of pre-state society can be seen as a 
consequence of, 
[The] weaker authority of leaders, more egalitarian social structures and 
values, lower level of surplus production, and smaller populations of non-
state societies…To argue that the warriors or war making of a village 
society is ill disciplined, weakly led, constrained by inadequate logistics, 
‘unprofessional,’ disorganized and so on is to state a tautology:  These 
terms describe not how they make war, but how they live.46 
 d.   Technology 
It is often assumed that pre-state society could not make use of 
technology.  While it is true that these societies had little exposure to technology, they 
also had little cultural bias on how to use technology once it is acquired.  The use of 
modern technology when combined with traditional pre-state tactics was effective against 
other pre-state societies but has also been effectively employed against modern military 
forces.  The use of repeating rifles by the Sioux Indians at the Battle of the Little Bighorn 
is an outstanding example of this combination.  While the weaknesses of the pre-state 
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military leadership and logistics was not solved by the use of modern technology, the use 
of technologically advanced systems when wedded to irregular tactics allowed pre-state 
societies, and guerrilla forces to fight effectively against more modern or technologically 
advanced forces.   
Having little cultural bias as to how technology is to be used, plus little of 
what can be considered doctrine, allows the pre-state or hybrid society to realize a 
technology’s potential before it became apparent to the more modern forces.  Working 
with a limited technological base, pre-state societies have adopted and used technology in 
ways that more modern societies had not thought possible.  As an example Lawrence 
Keely relates how a tribal leader of the Eipo tribe of highland Irian Jaya, upon seeing an 
airplane for the first time, requested to be given a flight and to bring several large heavy 
stones along to drop on the villages of his enemies.   
This tribal Billy Mitchell had immediately recognized the military value of 
aerial bombardment –far more quickly than the military leaders of the 
civilized nations that created and developed the airplane.47  
A more modern example is the use of cellular phones and television broadcasts for 
command and control by hybrid societies and guerrilla groups as well as grasping the 
importance of propaganda, the role of the media and, most recently, the internet in 
gaining an advantage over their more modern enemy. 
Pre-state warfare was a brutal endeavor.  It was total and focused on 
winning not a battle, but the war as societal survival was predicated on being victorious 
in war.  Pre-state warfare is directly linked to the social organization of society.  However 
pre-state societies and, currently, hybrid societies have shown the ability to grasp, not 
only new ideas and concepts, but to assimilate technology to make their existing 
organization and methods more effective. 
Primitive (and guerrilla) warfare consists of war stripped to the essentials: 
the murder of enemies; the theft or destruction of their sustenance, wealth, 
and essential resources; and the inducement in them of insecurity and 
terror.  It conducts the basic business of war without recourse to 
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ponderous formations or equipment, complicated maneuvers, strict chains 
of command…or other civilized embellishments.48 
Overall pre-state society’s main weakness was not its methods but rather its inability to 
create strong leadership in order to rectify weaknesses in planning, training, and logistics.  
However, to do this would have entailed modernization, which most likely would have 
transformed these societies into western style states. 
2. Modern  
The modern military is an outgrowth of the contemporary technology oriented 
society and is rooted in the hierarchical organization necessary to efficiently manage 
complex organization and institutions.    
a.  Professionalism 
The modern military is organized as a professional force and exists 
because of modern society’s specialization of labor, and the ability of the state to 
subordinate its citizens to its desire.  The military is based on a large cadre of long 
serving leaders and relies on a steady influx of volunteers willing to undergo extensive 
training and cultural assimilation in order to serve the state.   
A modern military accepts all citizens that meet basic medical, educational 
and moral standards, and proceeds to train them to a standard individual level.  Once the 
basics are met, specialized training to support the high level of specialization found in the 
modern military is conducted.  Once all individual training is accomplished the main 
focus of military training is on unit or collective training to coalesce individuals into units 
capable of responding almost as one.  Officers are similarly selected and trained.  
Charged with leading military units they command hierarchically organized units that are 
trained and organized to conduct specific missions in combat.  The authority of officers is 
guaranteed through laws that give them the ability to coerce those unwilling to submit to 
their leadership.  Dissent to orders is not permitted as rules and the means to enforce 
them are present, just as in modern society.  Modern military leaders are neither elected 
nor appointed for a specific period of combat.  Rather they are appointed and 
administered through a combination of the state’s military and civilian leadership.  A key 
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difference in modern society is that society controls the military via the political system, 
as military leaders respond to governmental control.  This socio-political control of the 
military leadership prevents the rise of warlords and the eclipse of civilian control of the 
government.  The modern military leaders, unlike their pre-state counterparts, are grown 
not born. 
b.  Organization 
Modern military forces are national in character; that is they are comprised 
of all strata and groups within society.  Kinship does not play a factor in either 
recruitment or advancement of the force.  Modern forces are standing and 
institutionalized rather than organized ad hoc for a specific emergency. While itself a 
specialized segment of society, the military is internally specialized as well to provide 
combat forces as well as supporting forces, training centers, medical and base functions, 
and is a complete microcosm of society.  The internal specialization is, in turn, supported 
by specialized sectors of society that allow for extensive support to the military 
establishment in their defense of the state. 
If a pre-state’s military was organized to support tactical operations, the 
modern military is organized to conduct campaigns in support of a long-term strategy.  
To accomplish this, the modern military organization is hierarchical and its leadership is 
distinct from the society’s political leadership who ultimately controls the military.   
Hierarchical organization provides for positive control of modern forces and allows for 
centralized planning.  It also provides for the integration of logistical functions, and 
ensures the uniformity of individual and collective training.  Finally, hierarchical 
organization facilitates accountability and ensures discipline can be applied. 
On the other hand, the modern hierarchical structure tends to stifle the 
ingenious leader, possibly preventing him from reaching his full potential.  The 
bureaucracy created in making a hierarchical control structure effective provides a brake 
on the adaptation necessary by the force to counter unique threats and allows asymmetric 
forces, such as those employing guerrilla warfare, to be more effective than their size or 
capability warrants.  The military bureaucracy tends to view new technology or 
techniques through the prism of existing doctrine, thereby nullifying rapid changes in 
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effectiveness.  The strength of the military bureaucracy and the doctrine it creates, 
therefore, has a decided impact, both positive and negative, on the operations the modern 
forces conduct. 
c.  Operations 
Both Keely and Turney-High offer insight into what modern military 
operations consist of.  Keely’s assertion that, 
Civilized soldiers have often lost to warriors in combat despite superior 
weaponry, unit discipline, and military science, but they have seldom lost 
campaigns or wars… 
Is correct and comes despite the fact that, 
The techniques of civilized war are focused on winning battles, whereas 
those to the tribesmen and guerrillas are devoted to winning everything 
else especially wars. 49 
At first this seems contradictory, however modern military science places a premium on 
winning battles in the hope of forcing the enemy into a decisive battle where he can be 
defeated.  Turney-High’s emphasis on the creation of tactical principals that can be 
passed on through training as the standard by which modern society determines effective 
vice defective military organizations supports Keely’s statements.  Turney-High saw the 
ability to conduct battle as the epitome of a modern military and completely disregards 
the ineffectiveness of a force organized for decisive battle against a force that refuses to 
engage in a western style battle.   
  As such the modern military is ill prepared to combat forces whose 
primary tactical maneuvers are the raid and ambush, who have little compunction about 
massacring their enemies, and who make little distinction between civilians and the 
military.  This dichotomy is the essence of asymmetric warfare; an asymmetry in what is 
allowable and acceptable to each society and culture.  The dichotomy also gives an 
insight as to why the modern society, constrained by the rule of law, has difficulty in 
defeating hybrid society’s using pre-state methods.  Modern forces are constrained by 
modern laws governing combat, which are derived from a contemporary view of warfare, 
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and will always be inefficient when employed against a hybrid military force that is 
unconstrained by the modern western perception of warfare and law of war.  
Furthermore, hybrid forces understand this weakness and exploit it through the use of the 
modern mass media.  Finally, modern tactics and planning are overly centralized, 
ponderous, and excessively focused on logistics and force protection when compared to 
those employed by pre-state and hybrid societies.  While these modern traits are essential 
if fighting culturally and technologically similar forces, they tend to be unresponsive and 
ineffective against asymmetric threats.  
  Modern logistics of necessity must be superior to pre-state or hybrid 
societies logistical capability.  First, modern forces conduct campaigns; second, modern 
law prevents the denuding of an enemy’s countryside to support military forces in the 
field; third, the high level of technology found in a modern military drives an increasing 
need for high levels of support whether that is fuel, food, maintenance, or comfort items.  
It is the logistics ability of the modern forces, when combined with a high level of 
technology and strong leadership that allows modern forces to overcome deficiencies in 
the tactical ability of the modern force.  Keely sees logistics as one of the two essential 
variables in distinguishing pre-state forces from modern forces.   
To a great extent, the superior transportation and agricultural technology 
of Europe and its efficient economic and logistics methods made possible 
its triumph over the primitive world, not its customary military techniques 
and advanced weapons.50    
d.  Technology 
While modern society has always been more technologically advanced 
than pre-state society, this fact has not manifested itself in an overly dominant success on 
the battlefield.  The western military has an insatiable appetite for technology; however, 
it tends to have parochial views on how technology is to be employed.  Advanced 
communications networks and computers are ubiquitous throughout the modern military 
yet the military remains organized as it was during the First World War.  Whereas hybrid 
states have the ability to use technology in ways that greatly enhance their operational 
effectiveness, the modern force tends to employ technology in an evolutionary fashion 
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that provides greater efficiency, better command and control, and more detailed planning 
rather than allowing advances to drive new organizations and operational techniques.   
The hierarchical structure and centralized leadership of the modern 
military provides distinct advantages and efficiencies to modern forces better command 
and control, standardized training, development of leaders, integration of logistics into 
operations, and the integration of societal surplus into the military system to sustain 
campaigns.  Yet it also provides distinct disadvantages when called on to fight against 
asymmetric threats.  The strengths of the modern military highlights it weaknesses; its 
centralized, hierarchical nature has become overly bureaucratic, hence slow and 
unresponsive; its reliance on technology does not, however, harness technology for 
greater effectiveness; thinking is dominated by a dominant paradigm, doctrine, that 
makes innovation and initiative difficult; and finally, a feeling of cultural superiority that 
tends to downplay that which is not either modern or western. 
In the future the threat posed by asymmetric hybrid warfare must be 
addressed.  It must be remembered that hybrid warfare, the contemporary form of 
guerrilla warfare, is a continuation of pre-state warfare that has become more effective 
because it employs both modern technology and modern mobilization methods.  Without 
a capability to effectively counter the asymmetric threat, a minor threat to the West will 
quickly become the West’s main future threat.  To effectively counter hybrid warfare an 
understanding of how the hybrid society is organized, thinks, and views western methods 
is essential, as is an understanding of how the hybrid society employs modern 
institutions, theories, and the technology available.  Currently, the Chechen insurgency 
gives an insight into how a modern society based on kinship, that is devolving towards 
particularistic roots, mixes the traditional with the modern and organizes to fight a 
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III.  THE CHECHENS 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The Chechens’ strength resides in strong and crosscutting associational networks 
that are founded on the strength of the extended family, teip; a common enemy, Russia; 
and a pervasive religion, Sufi Islam.  These components form the basis of what Anatol 
Lieven calls “The deep underlying strengths of Chechen society and…tradition as 
tempered and hardened by the historical experiences of the past 200 years.”  The 
Chechen culture is imbued with strength and confidence and has demonstrated complete 
solidarity and mutual reliance when threatened by an outside force.  The Chechens’ 
believe in their superiority and in the absolute moral and national justification of their 
fight.51   
The current conflict in Chechnya has spawned a lasting guerrilla movement that 
employs hybrid warfare because, when threatened by an outside force, the Chechens band 
together into a coherent and almost fanatical mass to defend their culture, society and 
territory.  This fanaticism is raised through the cultural ethos of an isolated traditional 
society.  The inherent strength of the traditional Chechen society, which binds them 
together more firmly than the citizens of many established states, makes it difficult for 
the Russians to defeat them.  Islam is one of the tools used by the Chechen leadership to 
mobilize society and is one that transcends its internal mobilizing ability by making 
possible the mobilization of support from Islamic states and groups to a pariah regime.   
B.  SOCIETY  
Chechen society remains primordial and is characterized by close family 
relations, reverence for the teip and tukum, egalitarian relations, and a lack of state or 
national institutions.  While nominally Islamic in character, Chechen society is a mix of 
ancient customs, Christianity, and Islam.  The strength and adaptability of Chechen 
society is its decentralized clan and village structure.  In Anatol Lieven’s words, 
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In peacetime they recognize no sovereign authority, and may be 
fragmented into a hundred rival clans.  However, in time of danger, when 
faced with aggression the rival clans unite and elect a military leader.52   
Chechen society developed without outside influence for almost four thousand 
years.  Separated from the Kingdom of Georgia by the Caucasus Mountains and from 
Kieven Rus by the steppes, the Chechen nation developed without any major power 
contact until the sixteenth century.53  Lack of major power influence prevented a feudal 
system from being established and resulted in a Chechen society that was egalitarian with 
strong intra-clan ties.  Without any powerful enemies, the need for strong or centralizing 
state structure was lacking, and Chechen society developed around the extended family.  
Chechen society revolves around two organizing structures.  The main structure is the 
tribe or clan, which can be further dissected into tribes of the lowlands and tribes of the 
mountains or highlands.   This social and physical division of Chechnya is recognized in 
the official name of the Chechen Republic:  Chechnya-Ichkeria.  Ichkeria is comprised of 
the two mountainous southern districts of Shaoti and Vedeno.54   
  The tribal organization of Chechen society is based on the teip.55  Chechnya is 
composed of approximately 150 teips, the members of which are identified by tracing 
their lineage back twelve generations.  Physically, a teip covers two or three villages 
consisting of approximately 400-600 people and is sub-divided into groupings known as 
neke or gar, which are smaller kinship groups consisting of 10-50 households.56  Teips 
are organized into nine tukums or tribes, as legend holds that all Chechens are 
descendants from an original family of nine brothers.57  
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The leadership of the teips is a council of elders, and each of the 150 teips not 
only has their own council of elders, but also has their own leadership traditions.  
Generally, elders receive the utmost respect from the members of the teip.  At times the 
elders’ authority has been strong.  However, ten years of war with Russia and economic 
collapse has weakened this strong leadership based on respect and brought to the 
forefront younger leaders.  These younger leaders, essentially war leaders, have been 
chosen due to their demonstrated leadership and courage in combat with the Russians.  
The concept of war leaders is not new to the Chechens and, during the seventeenth 
century, war leadership among the Chechens had developed into a system that was based 
on “personal achievement and prestige not hereditary with the council of elders of a teip 
choosing its leader.”58  The current leadership arrangement has the council of elders 
making recommendations that may or may not be followed by the younger war leaders 
and is not unlike that seen historically in Chechnya during conflict.  Sergei Arutyunov, a 
member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and head of the Caucasus Department at 
Moscow Ethnology Institute, characterizes the Chechen clan leadership similarly.  
[A] Clan may have more or less informal elders.  These elders may form a 
kind of council—a clan council—which may give nonobligatory 
recommendations, which will probably be more or less followed by the 
majority of the clan members.59  
This elder merit based leadership operated in a manner similar to that of the Plains 
Indians of America.  These characterizations of clan leadership, a leadership based on 
respect for elders, voluntary compliance, and the election of war leaders based on 
personal abilities and valor, has been commonly found in egalitarian societies throughout 
history.   
The social cohesion created by a society organized around the extended family 
has been repeatedly seen in the two contemporary Chechen wars.  Ian Chesnov, a  
professor of anthropology at Russia’s State Humanitarian University in Moscow, says, 
“[A] ccording to Caucasus tradition a member of a teip is never abandoned in a time of 
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trouble.”60  This underlying loyalty to family and duty has been transferred to 
contemporary Chechen warfare where teips send fighters to battle the Russians in 
shifts.61 The result of this intra-teip rotation of forces is that Chechens are always fighting 
with kinsmen and benefit from the moral and ethical justification this provides. 
The tukum, loosely composed of teips, in the past has been the basis of organizing 
forces for combat.  The nine tukums, according to Valery Batuev, a Caucasian issues 
reporter for the Vremya MN daily, are “Political-military unions meant to function in 
cases of [outside] threats of aggression.”62  Today this fighting role has been taken over 
by the teip and the tukum, perhaps because it is a leaderless collection of clans, has little, 
other than symbolic influence over events in contemporary Chechnya. 
The loose association, egalitarianism, and strong family ties evident in 
contemporary Chechen socio-political organization have long been the hallmark of 
Chechen society.  As Lieven states: 
In particular the tribal and egalitarian form of traditional Chechen society 
has in more recent times contributed greatly to the Chechen ability, both to 
resist conquest and assimilation, and to maintain ethnic numbers by co-
opting members of neighboring ethnic groups.  The Chechens have been 
much less likely than their neighbors to be demoralized by destruction and 
cooption of their elites, for the simple reason that in the past four centuries 
they never really had any, whether secular of religious.63  
While gaining an increasingly strong feeling of Chechen nationhood through almost three 
centuries of conflict with the Russians and surviving thirteen years of internal exile, the 
Chechens have not been able to break the tribal bonds and create modern state 
institutions.  In fact clan associations have become increasingly important in the last 
decade as a survival mechanism and a counter to Russian aggression.  
Two concepts introduced by Robert Montague, regarding the Berber tribes of 
Morocco, are central to understanding contemporary Chechen society and politics.  The 
concepts are,  
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That of ‘Oscillation’ between a loose tribal democracy, and an unstable 
personal autocracy; and that of ‘Ordered Anarchy,’ whereby a society 
appears to an outsider to be utterly chaotic and riven by internal feuds in 
fact obeys extremely strict rules and restraints in its behavior, and most 
importantly in its capacity to mobilize against a common enemy.64 
“Oscillation” can be seen in the succession of charismatic and religious leaders; Sheik 
Mansur, Imam Shamil, and Golinsky.  Even today, Shamil Basayev and Khattab have 
more charismatic and nationalistic appeal than the elected Chechen president Aslan 
Mashkadov.  “Ordered anarchy” is a brilliant description of Chechen society.  Being 
tribal in nature, Chechen society appears anarchic, corrupt, and violent when viewed 
from a modern western perspective, but is in fact governed by strict adat, ancestral 
customs, and Sufism, which maintain order and discipline in society.   
The second organizing principal of Chechen society is Islam.  The Chechens 
adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam; however, Sufism has been the most prevalent of 
Chechen religious beliefs since it blended well with the egalitarian nature of Chechen 
society.  Furthermore, it combined well with the adat, and even allowed these customs to 
supercede religious teachings at times.  Sufism, while varying from one teip to another, 
remains a common point of reference all Chechens hold, and it is understandable that all 
pre-twentieth century Chechen leaders were foremost religious leaders. 
C.  ISLAM 
Although losing some of its appeal to the secularism underlying the Soviet system 
and the nationalism driven by the Russian invasion, Islam has been the unifier of 
Chechens throughout the entire history of the Russian-Chechen conflict.  Chechens 
adhere to Sufism, which differs greatly from the commonly held Western vision of Islam, 
as a radical and violent religion.  In the unlikely even that a Sufist state would form the 
state would be inward looking and regionally oriented, and not the radical state feared by 
Russia.   
  Islam entered the north Caucasus during the seventh and eighth centuries via 
Dagestan.  From Dagestan, Sunni Islam spread westward along the northern rim of the 
Caucasus Mountains weakening as it moved west.  By the eighth century, the north 
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Caucasus was mostly Islamicized.  However, Islam remained in competition with, and 
was influenced by ancient religious beliefs and cultural traditions, which resulted in the 
religion being influenced by local customs and traditions.  The result is a population that 
is not strongly converted to Islam.  Conversions began to increase at the same time that 
Russian influence and zeal at spreading Orthodox Christianity in the region was on the 
rise.65   
1.  Sufism 
The Chechens’ converted to Islam later than the rest of the Caucasian peoples 
because religion was not enthusiastically accepted.  However, by the late eighteenth 
century Sunni Islam with a particular emphasis on Sufism, had taken root in Chechnya.  
Sufism is not easily defined.  However, it is generally accepted as a “popular” form of 
Islam.  Its adoption was most likely due to its amenability to the incorporation of outside 
influences, such as the Chechen adat, as well as the vestiges of Christianity that remained 
in the region.  Sufi’s look upon themselves,  
 [A] s Muslims who take seriously God’s call to perceive his presence 
both in the world and in the self.  They tend to stress inwardness over 
outwardness, contemplation over action, spiritual development over 
legalism, and cultivation of the soul over social interaction.66  
Sufism is a reflective, internal belief commonly referred to as Mysticism in the 
West, whose strength lies in its ability to mobilize people as it allows them the ability to 
find God’s presence within themselves and their community.  The goal of Sufism is to 
establish a direct contact with God.  In Chechnya Sufism followed in the tradition of al 
Bistami’s Nasqshbandiyah Order, however, a minority follow Abd al-Qadiri al-Gilani’s 
Qadiri Brotherhood.   
a.  Nasqshbandiyah 
Nasqshbandiyah is a Central Asian form of Sufism that spread east to west 
becoming less radical as it entered Ottoman lands.  Subsequently adopted by the 
Ottomans, Nasqshbandiyah became the dominant form of Sufism in the Ottoman Empire 
and the Caucasus.  The Nasqshbandiyah Order served as a significant part of the social 
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fabric in the region of Chechnya, and provided a structure for intra-and interregional 
networks among the ulama and commercial classes.  Two of the leading characteristics of 
the Nasqshbandiyah Order is “a frequent tendency to political involvement,” and passive 
resistance to secularism.67  These characteristics have prepared Chechen society to 
support the organization of resistance movements.  These anti-foreign68 movements 
became more pronounced in Chechnya during the nineteenth century when the 
Nasqshbandiyah leaders organized resistance movements against the Russians calling 
them jihad.69  While successful in waging jihad, these same leaders were incapable of 
establishing a viable Islamic state in the region as Sufism in the nineteenth century, much 
like Islam today, was not capable of being used as an alternative to the nation state. 
Outside of the Caucasus, Nasqshbandiyah exhibited similar tendencies toward revolt and 
state building.  In Kurdistan, Nasqshbandiyah became gradually intertwined with Kurdish 
separatism and nationalism, much like what is seen in Chechnya today, helping to create 
the Kurdish uprising of 1880, which, although successful in creating an independent 
Kurdistan, was not successful in consolidating the victory with a viable state.70   
b.  Qadiri 
The Qadiri Brotherhood arose in the Persian province of Gilan near 
Baghdad.  Its basis is the writings and seminars of Abd al-Qadiri who had a reputation as 
a great holy man, but only became interested in Sufi activities toward the end of his 
career.  His sons and grandsons founded the Brotherhood after his death.  While leaving 
no particular Sufi tradition of his own, his son’s loose arrangements and focus on the 
philanthropic aspects of Sufism led to its rapid spread.  The Qadiri Brotherhood has a 
strong influence from the sub-continent and it still widely practiced there.71 
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Qadiri first entered the Caucasus in the mid-nineteenth century from 
Turkey.  The Brotherhoods’ patron, a Dagestani named Kunta Khaji, believed in an open 
more “ecstatic” form of devotion than that practiced by the Nasqshbandiyah Order, and is 
likely a legacy of the Indian influences on the Brotherhood.72  The Qadiri’s, being a 
minority sect within Chechnya, have little impact on the Nasqshbandiyah’s influence 
over Chechen society. Positively the two sects coexist peacefully, and the Qadiri 
brotherhood, with its Caucasian roots in Dagestan, illuminates the role Dagestan has and 
continues to play as the Caucasus’s center of Islam.   
Nasqshbandiyah and Qadiri provide a societal framework, which 
strengthened the communal identity and provided organization to the resistance against 
the Orthodox Christian Russians attempts at suppressing the Caucasian peoples and 
Islam.  Nasqshbandiyah and Qadiri have remained influential in society throughout the 
modern era, but have not played a leading role in resistance to either Soviet or Russian 
repression as “the Order has not produced in the twentieth century a leader of notable 
gifts that would give him broad universal appeal and reinvigorate the order as a whole.”73  
The lack of leadership is possibly a result of the Soviet suppression of Islam and the 
execution of its religious leaders in 1937.  In any case, the result is that the 
Nasqshbandiyah Order has gone on divergent paths throughout Chechnya as nationalism 
began to strengthen and eclipse Islam as the main mobilizing force in society.   
2.  Wahabbism 
The rise of nationalism, while diffusing the effects of Sufism, has not caused its 
eclipse, nor has it led to an increase in radical Islamic beliefs to fill the religious void.  
Throughout the twentieth century only a small minority of Chechens have held radical 
Islamic beliefs.  Today this minority belongs mainly to the Wahabbi sect and has minimal 
influence among the population and the state.  Wahhabism is opposed to the principals 
upon which Sufism is based, and the antagonism between the two forms of Islam is 
substantial and cannot be overcome.   
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Wahhabism has been ardently anti-Sufi since its inception.  Adherents of 
Wahhabism see in Sufis “spiritual stagnation and …excesses,” and denounce the Sufi 
practice of praying to saints, and seeing this as polytheism.  Al-Wahhab also sought to 
replace the tribal solidarity present in Sufi lands with religious solidarity, “purifying the 
religion from what [he] considered extraneous practices.”74  Wahhabists view themselves 
as followers of a pure Islam and believe that incorporating any practices not specifically 
sanctioned by the Koran is a deviation of Islam, and those practicing anything but pure 
Islam are heretics.  A further difference between Sufists and Wahhabists lies in their 
differing interpretation of the concept of Jihad.  To the Sufis, jihad is the inner battle on 
the road to perfection of oneself, while for the Wahhabis, jihad is an external conflict 
against infidels.  
It can be seen that Wahhabism is a drastically different view of Islam than that 
practiced by the Sufis in the Caucasus and Chechnya.  The small percentage of Chechens 
who do claim to be Wahhabists follow a loser form of Wahabbism that is only remotely 
linked to the teachings of the eighteenth century Sheik Wahhab.75  By following a 
watered down version of Wahhabism, these Chechens are considered no better than the 
Sufists and are likewise viewed as apostates by the “true” Wahhabists.  The true Chechen 
Wahabbists are currently outside Chechnya.  In Chechnya the true Wahhabists are 
currently only the small number of Arab and other foreigners helping to fight the 
Russians.76   
3.  The Role of Islam in Chechen Society 
Domination by the secular Soviet state for over 70 years and the rise of 
nationalism created by this domination are partly the reasons a Nasqshbandiyah or Qadiri 
leader has not emerged during the current insurgency.  Throughout the insurgency, 
Islamic beliefs have taken a back seat to kinship loyalties and nationalism.  According to 
professor Salvi, “Sufi brotherhoods were unable to function in the new conditions [of war 
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200.  Although the total number having cycled through Chechnya during the war has undoubtedly been 
much higher. 
and nationalism], the sheiks were able to exercise moral authority only in the conditions 
of social peace.”77   
In 1991 Jokhar Dudayev, going against Chechen history, explicitly ruled out the 
creation of an Islamic republic stating, “ Where any religion prevails over the secular 
constitutional organization of the state either the Spanish Inquisition or Islamic 
fundamentalism will emerge.”78  Illustrating the secular basis of the government and the 
desires of the people Dudayev’s election platform said almost nothing regarding Islam or 
religion.  Dudayev’s military commander and successor as President, Aslan Mashkhadov, 
also supports a secular government.  Shamil Basayev, the charismatic leader of the 
insurgency, and regarded as an Islamic opponent to Mashkhadov’s Presidency, has also 
repeatedly denounced a desire to establish an Islamic regime.  In a September 1999 
interview, Basayev, considered a “convinced” Muslim, but not a “strict” one,79 reiterated 
his rejection of militant Islam and the creation of an Islamic state.80  Despite Basayev’s 
stated intentions the Russians continue to claim that he desires to establish a radical 
Islamic state, vice a anti-Russian nationalistic state, in Chechnya.   
All sides of the conflict have used, and continue to use, the threat of a radical 
Islamic government to further their ends.  According to Lieven, the Russian,  
[E] xaggeration of the political role of religion in pre-war Chechnya was 
an effort to brand the Chechen separatists as Muslim fundamentalists.  The 
intention…has generally been threefold:  to appeal to Western audiences 
with the line that the war has been a Western crusade against a common 
Islamic enemy; to argue that the Chechens are too “primitive” to have 
developed a modern nationalism and a sense of national identity; and to 
suggest that as simple primitive people they have been misled by religious 
propaganda into acting contrary to their own best interests.81 
The Chechens have exploited radical Islam to receive external support; money, military 
training, manpower, and equipment from radical former Afghan Mujahideen.  While 
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small in scale this support, along with participation in criminal activities such as drug and 
weapons smuggling, has allowed the Chechens to continue fighting Russia even though 
they are not recognized or receive support from other nations.  The support received from 
Arabs, possibly related to the nineteenth century diaspora, has increased the effectiveness 
of the insurgency, but has opened a rift between the Islamists, who are mostly non-
Chechens, and the Chechen authorities and remaining Sufi leaders.  Radical support for 
the insurgency, and the destruction of the existing state institutions, has only slightly 
increased the number of Chechens adhering to radical beliefs.  Unfortunately, the longer 
Russia continues to assert its domination over Chechnya the greater the void of political 
and social control will become.  Filling this void will either be a more radical Islamic 
leadership, fulfilling Russia’s prophecy of having a radical regime on its flank, or more 
likely, strongly anti-Russian radical groups which can operate in the lawlessness created 
by a lack of state control in the region.  
The tension between Sufism and radical Islamic beliefs as well as the Chechens’ 
hostility toward those with radical beliefs, will make it difficult for a radical Islamic state 
to be formed.  Links to radical Islamic and terrorist organizations exist, as they did with 
the Muslims in Bosnia, but Chechnya, like Bosnia, is a case of receiving support and 
recognition from co-religionists, and not a case of accepting the beliefs and desires these 
supporters espouse. The Chechens’ strongest desire is to recreate the high point of 
Chechen cultural and political dominance, the Mountaineer Republic, and not create an 
Islamic state, radical or not. 
D.  CHECHEN HISTORY 
Chechen culture has been shaped by the clashes between the competing 
ideologies and religions of the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian Empires.  The initial 
contact between the Russians and the Circassians82 came in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.83  However, it is only in the early eighteenth century and Russian conflict with 
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the Ottoman Empire, that we begin to see an interest in, and efforts to control the 
Caucasus.   
1.  Sheik Mansur 
Increasing tensions between the Ottomans and the Russians was felt in the north 
Caucasus by an increasing Russian repression of the Circassians.  It is during the early 
period of the Russo-Turkish Wars that we see the rise of the first great Circassian leader, 
Ushurma.  Ushurma, claiming to be a Chechen, was the Mountain tribes’ first organized 
leader.84  Ushurma, later adopting the title Sheik Mansur (Victor), was a strong religious 
leader as well as a charismatic military leader.  Mansur’s egalitarian Nasqshbandiyah 
Order of Sufism appealed to Chechen society because it was tolerant of local customs and 
traditions while supporting the Chechen will to resist Russian subjugation of their lands. 
Sheik Mansur united the Circassians, including the Chechens, by declaring a gazavat, 
holy war,85 against the Russians.  Resistance began in 1785 and, in this year, he 
surrounded and killed 600 Russian soldiers sent by Catherine the Great to subdue the 
rebellion.86  However, after this initial success and his only famous victory, Mansur’s 
fortunes began to turn, and by 1787 the Russians has regained the initiative.87  Mansur 
was captured in 1791, and was imprisoned in St. Petersburg, where he died in 1794.  
Sheik Mansur’s main impact on the North Caucasus was the ending of internecine 
conflict, which had previously prevented the Circassians from uniting and effectively 
defending against Russian attempts at subjugation.88   
Without a successor the resistance fragmented, and internecine conflict among the 
Circassians returned.  The peoples of the central North Caucasus, the Ossetian, 
Kabardians, and the Ingush, sought accommodation with the Russians rather than 
continuing the struggle, effectively splitting the resistance efforts between the Cherkess 
in the west and the Chechens and Dagestanis in the east.  This split resistance made the 
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Russian counterinsurgency efforts considerably easier than if they faced a united 
movement.89   Nevertheless, the Russians were not able to translate this opportunity into 
any lasting territorial gains, and their treatment of the subjugated Caucasian peoples 
alienated them furthering their hatred at the Russians. 
2.  Imam Shamil 
During the later Russo-Turkish Wars the man regarded as Mansur’s successor and 
held as the greatest of all Caucasian leaders, Imam Shamil, rose to prominence.  Shamil, 
a Dagestani, continued the use of Sufi Islam to bind together the resistance to Russian 
attempts at subjugation.  Initially leading a rebellion in Dagestan from 1834-1839, he was 
chased from the region and found refuge in Chechnya.  However, within three years 
Shamil had not only reformed the insurgency in Dagestan, but also spread it to Chechnya 
at the request of the Chechens.90  Under Shamil the Chechens became the most fiercely 
dedicated of the North Caucasian peoples to north Caucasian independence and were 
initially Shamil’s most ardent supporters.91   
During the 1840s Shamil established a nascent state comprising the Chechens,  
Ingush, and the Dagestanis.  A rudimentary taxation system was implemented and this 
supported a standing army of 5500 cavalry and 8870 infantry as well as a reserve of 
between 30-40,000 people.  Shamil also established a legal system based on the sharia 
with which he intended to replace some of the more onerous adats then governing 
Chechen society.92   
Shamil’s rule was extremely repressive, almost as repressive as Russian 
occupation.  His repressive rule was partly a function of the state being formed during 
war and remaining in continuous conflict with Russia and partly because the basis of the 
state was Islam with its legal foundations rooted in religious law.  The repressive nature 
of Shamil’s rule and the suspension of Chechen adat caused extensive dissent.  However, 
the Russians conquered the Imamate before dissent could build enough to cause it to 
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collapse from within.  The Chechen historian Yanus Akhmadove explains the paradox of 
desiring independence and strong leaders, but loathing repression and the giving up of 
individual sovereignty to a state, 
The tough military discipline prevailing in the Imamate was unusual for 
the Mountain People of Chechnya; the excessive regulation of private and 
public life, the arbitrary actions of the naids, of the Shamil administration 
as a whole, caused protests that ranged from simple flight to armed 
uprisings.93 
This same paradox, could be seen as President Dudayev’s government formed in the 
early 1990s and remains as an underlying tension in all attempts by Aslan Mashkhadov’s 
attempt at rebuilding Chechnya after the 1994-96 war. 
Imam Shamil’s rebellion, while overall more coherent and better organized than 
Sheik Mansur’s, lacked three decisive characteristics in addition to alienating the 
Mountain Peoples, which might have made his efforts lasting.  First, the rebellion did not 
incorporate all the Circassian groups; second, Shamil never succeeded in coordinating his 
actions with the rest of the rebelling Circassians; and third, his struggle received little 
outside help or recognition even during the Crimean War.94  Shamil left a legacy of 
stubborn resistance, extreme tenacity, and the ability to recover from apparently crushing 
defeats, which can be seen in today’s rebellion.95  Taking Mansur’s efforts one-step 
further, Imam Shamil attempted, unsuccessfully in the end, to create a centralized Islamic 
administration for Chechen society.96  While Shamil failed in both his rebellion and his 
attempt at state building, he did heighten the national feeling among the Chechens and, 
more specifically, reinforced the deeply militant, anti-Russian stance the people 
possessed.  Shamil also initiated the beginnings of a distinct Chechen vice Caucasian or 
Circassian identity.   
After Shamil’s defeat in 1859, and the creation of the Terek Province by the 
Russians in 1860, the will of the Chechens to resist increased.  Despite this the Russians 
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brutally subjugated the region, but due to the Chechen’s fierce and long lasting resistance 
they retained, “the right to practice Islam and the Shariat, bear arms, and not be 
conscripted into the Russian Army.”97  The goal of Russian occupation was to force the 
emigration of the inhabitants of the North Caucasus while subjugating those remaining.    
Emigration left the Chechens, already the most nationalistic of the Circassian peoples, 
now the most numerous as well.98  By-products of Russian policy was the creation of a 
diaspora willing to continue the fight against the Russians and the rise of Chechnya as the 
driving force of Caucasian separatism and resistance.  Russian policies resulted in a 
permanent occupation of Chechnya.  Only during the years of the Mountaineer Republic, 
and between 1994 and 1999, were Russian or Soviet troops absent from the region 
Russian occupation did not quash the Chechens’ desire for independence.  The 
stories of Sheik Mansur and Imam Shamil’s exploits were passed by word of mouth to 
succeeding generations keeping the spirit of resistance alive.  According to Henze, “A 
significant portion of the population rallied to rebel leadership as each generation brought 
a new burst of resistance to Russian domination most often led by men of religious 
status.”99 Active and passive resistance would continue throughout Chechnya and, as late 
as 1894, the region was still not considered pacified.   
3.  Civil War 
The Bolshevik revolution provided the Chechens with an opportunity to once 
again throw off Russian subjugation.  In August 1917, Golinsky100 was elected Imam of 
Dagestan and Chechnya.  He established a religious monarchy, the Mountaineer 
Republic, enthroning Said Bek, a great grandson of Imam Shamil, as its symbolic leader 
and created an army of 10,000 followers.101  By 1919 General Deniken’s White Russian 
forces, attempting to maintain the territorial extent of the Tsar’s empire, came into 
conflict with Golinsky’s forces and savagely repressed the Chechens’ attempt at 
autonomy.  This repression and the Bolsheviks’ stated liberal policies regarding 
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nationalities drove Golinsky into openly cooperating with them.  After the defeat of the 
White Russian forces, the Bolsheviks consolidated power in the Caucasus and squeezed 
out local rule, forcing the practice of Islam to go underground, and causing Golinsky to 
revolt against the Bolsheviks. 
In January 1921, Stalin, as the Bolshevik Commissar on Nationalities, promised 
amnesty for those participating in Golinsky’s rebellion if they recognized Soviet power.  
As part of Stalin’s deal the Mountaineer Republic was disbanded and  “The Mountainous 
Autonomous Republic was created…[which] had both a constitution based on shariat 
law and a flag with a Soviet emblem.”102  The Mountainous Autonomous Republic was 
comprised of all the northeastern Caucasian republics except Dagestan.  With this 
agreement Chechen resistance began to wane.  In 1922 the Chechens were given their 
own autonomous republic, effectively ending any pretense of regional autonomy.  By the 
late 1920s the collectivization of the region’s agriculture and the realization that the 
Bolsheviks desired to keep the Russian Empire intact forced the Chechens into rebellion 
once again.  Revolt over collectivization culminated in a Red Army crackdown in 1930, 
which began a cycle of resistance and repression that would culminate in 1937 when 
Stalin ordered 14,000 Chechen and Ingush arrested and executed.103  These executions, 
targeting social and religious leaders, broke the back of the revolt, for the time, and the 
region remained quiet until 1940 when rebellion again flared up.    
4.  World War II 
The 1940 rebellion provided the pretext for the deportation of the Chechens and 
Ingush to Kazakhstan.  This rebellion is unique in Chechen history because it was led by 
a writer, Hasan Israilov, and a lawyer, Maribek Shevpov, instead of a religious leader104 
and reached its climax in 1942 as the Germans were pushing into the Caucasus.  The 
rebellion was crushed by massive force in early 1943, but the revolt had given Stalin the 
opportunity he needed to end Chechen rebellion against Soviet rule.  As the rebellion was 
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being crushed, the Politburo approved a plan to expel all the Chechens and Ingush and to 
liquidate the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia.105    
Exile would have a searing effect on the Chechens; well over 100,000 would die 
over the next two years, and all present day Chechen leaders were either forced into exile 
or born in exile.  The next thirteen years saw the Chechens struggling to survive while 
scattered throughout Central Asia.  The harsh conditions encountered during the years of 
exile strengthened the bonds within the extended family and the Chechens’ attachment to 
their ancestral lands.  In April 1956 Khrushchev lifted internal exile and the Chechens 
moved en masse back to Chechnya where they became outsiders on their own lands.  As 
Aleksandr Nekrich describes it, 
Difficulties arose in connection with the reparation of the Chechen and 
Ingush, not only because of their large numbers but also as a result of their 
irrepressible determination to reoccupy ancestral homes.  The situation 
was further complicated by the fact that after 1944 the territory they had 
formerly inhabited was rather heavily colonized by new settlers from other 
regions and Republics. 
And further that, 
It was difficult to normalize relations between Chechens and Ingush on the 
one hand, and those who had occupied their land on the other.  The return 
of the Chechens and Ingush was, to put it mildly, not greeted 
with…enthusiasm by the local population.106  
The Chechens, returning faster than the Soviet government planned for, faced extreme 
poverty and discrimination.  Their official resettlement package included barely enough 
funds to repurchase or rebuild family property.  Additionally, the returnees were placed 
on a waiting list for membership on a collective farm, and had limited access to education  
and industrial jobs.107  The Ingush, being less anti-Russian, initially faced less 
discrimination, but struggled to regain control of the Prigorodnyi district that was 
transferred to the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). 
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In August 1958 tensions in the ASSR erupted over the killing of a Russian sailor 
by an Ingush at a dance in Grozny.  The incident brought four days of unrest and the 
worst post war racial clashes to that time.  Russian residents pressed for the re-expulsion 
of the Chechens and randomly beat and killed those with Caucasian features.  Order was 
restored only by the introduction of Soviet troops.  The period of the 1960s was one of 
relative calm as the booming oil industry and the process of rebuilding their lives 
ameliorated the Chechens proclivity to rebellion.  However, the underlying issues that 
created the tensions between the Chechens and the Russians were not addressed and 
large-scale unrest began again in February 1973.  As the large February demonstrations 
were forcibly broken up smaller clashes with Soviet authorities spun off and would 
become a constant feature of life in the ASSR.108  These constant low level clashes and 
demonstrations against the Russian and Soviet system were part of the struggle to right 
the injustices the Chechen and Ingush had suffered through deportation.  This constant 
state of tension, plus the experience of exile is the environment that most of the current 
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IV.  MILITARY  
A.  ORGANIZATION FOR WAR 
The Chechens fight much like they are organized socially decentralized with a 
lack of strong central leadership.  While organized, and on occasion, employed 
conventionally the Chechens excel at guerrilla warfare.  They have elevated this ancient 
form of warfare to new heights of efficiency by combining modern communications with 
a socially cohesive population that can implement swarming tactics effectively against 
the Russians.  The common western perception of the Chechen military organization, 
reinforced by Russian rhetoric, is that the Chechens are an untrained bandit force that is 
derived from a warrior culture.  While true the Chechens are from a society that places 
immense prestige on military prowess, their individual skill only partly accounts for their 
success in battle.  The less addressed aspect of the Chechen military is that they are a 
well-trained and equipped force that has blended Soviet and Western doctrine with 
classical guerrilla strategies and have demonstrated the ability to use modern technology 
more appropriately than their opponent. 
1.  Training  
The Chechen Republic began with a good military foundation.  In addition to 
being a martial people, many of the original Chechen fighters had served in the Soviet 
military.  These conscripts, serving mainly in the enlisted ranks, learned the basics of 
military discipline, leadership, weapons handling, and tactics.  The fact that few Soviet 
military officers were Chechen would become important, as the Chechens that rose to 
senior leadership in the insurgency would not be constrained in their tactical or 
operational thought by Soviet doctrine. 
The training of the Chechen military has always received a high priority.  Three 
distinct phases of training can be discerned, pre-war training in addition to that provided 
by the Soviet military, training during the first Chechen campaign, and training during 
the 1996-1999-time period.  The prewar training was paradoxically accomplished by the 
Russians and produced the leadership cadre that would defeat them during their first 
campaign, and which still operates effectively against them.   
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Many of the pre-war fighters received additional training and experience during 
the 1991-1994 period by participating in the various disputes between the newly 
independent Trans-Caucasian states.  The most well known unit of the era was the 
Chechen Battalion that supported the Abkhazian succession from Georgia.  This 500 man 
battalion led by Shamil Basayev, who would later become the leading and most 
charismatic of the Chechen commanders, was trained by Russian GRU and Spetsnaz.  
During the 18 months the battalion was involved in the Abkhazian succession movement 
Chechens were rotated through the battalion.109  Unknowingly, the Russians were 
training the leadership cadre they would soon be facing.  Additional training was received 
by Chechens fighting on both sides of the Nagorno-Karhbakh dispute, and small numbers 
of Chechens are said to have trained in guerrilla warfare, mine warfare, and ambush 
planning in the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan.110  
During the initial period of the first campaign the size of the Chechen forces 
expanded exponentially.  At first rigorous training was not possible as all available forces 
were placed in contact with the Russians near Grozny.  However, training still occurred 
in what can be considered a cadre style.  During this period, established units would 
provide cadres to recently formed units, and training would occur while in contact with 
the Russians.  Once trained, the cadre would move on to train another unit.  According to 
Shamil Basayev the process worked similarly in his units. 
Every time a new group came under my command I took two, three, or 
five people from my battalion of 70 that I had trained for 6 months [and] 
put them in every new group.  They organized things, fought for a day or 
two, and taught the others the basics.  They taught them right in battle, and 
then my five people would come back, and I would put them in another 
new group.111 
In this way Shamil’s forces grew from 70 fighters in the beginning of December to over 
700 by the end of the month. 
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After the initial battle of Grozny, training became more regimented and Chechens 
would spend up to three months training, depending on their assigned task; less time for 
riflemen and more for those manning crew–served weapons, or one of the few pieces of 
artillery or armor the Chechens maintained.112  A key aspect of this training was to 
inculcate the standard tactical unit of the resistance the 10-12-man hunter-killer group. 
In the 1996-1999 period regimented training continued at three camps in 
Chechnya.  The goal of President Mashkhadov was the demobilization of all militias that 
were created during the campaign and their replacement with a national force of 5-6000 
soldiers.113  However, demobilization of all militias proved difficult, especially the 
militias formed around foreign fighters that had come to Chechnya to fight the Russians.  
The most notable foreign fighter during the 1995-1999 period was Khattab, an Arab 
fighter ostensibly supporting Chechen goals.   Khattab established three training camps 
where his fighters received 6-12 weeks of training in guerrilla warfare, weapons, 
demolition techniques as well as Arabic and sharia law.114  Khattab’s camp remained 
open because he had strong supporters within the Chechen military establishment, 
provided excellent training and equipment due to his outside contacts, and has a small, 
well-trained force of Arab fighters that protect him from his Chechen enemies. 
2.  Leadership 
While the Chechens have a relatively modern view of training there is little 
military or government influence over the selection and training of the military 
leadership.  In the pre-war period leaders were chosen either through former relations to 
Dudayev, for example Salmon Raduyev is related to the former president, or through 
demonstrated leadership or training ability, for example Shamil Basayev.  These leaders 
along with several others initially demonstrated their skills by fighting in the disputes 
throughout the Caucasus and in the initial defense of Grozny.  The government has 
supported these successful leaders without having tight control over them because they 
attract followers who are used as soldiers.  
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These original leaders have been promoted because of their successes.  For 
example when Shamil Basayev was promoted to commander of the Grozny Garrison, he 
retained personal control of the two battalions he raised.  After the fall of Grozny he was 
promoted to the commander of the Shali battlefront, which comprised eleven 
battalions.115  As a battlefront commander Basayev was responsible for the operational 
level employment of his forces under the Minister of Defense, Aslan Mashkhadov’s 
direction.  However, while an operational level commander, he retained tactical control 
of the battalions he raised.  Finally, in the period between Russian campaigns Basayev 
was appointed as field commander of the eastern half of Chechnya.116  While it is not 
known if he still retains personal control of the units he raised, the forces under Khattab 
operate in his sector apparently only nominally under his control. 
While basing leadership on demonstrated ability and charisma makes eminent 
sense when your state is fighting for its existence, not being able to control leaders with 
their own bases of support is detrimental to the creation of a viable state.  The personal 
loyalty of the fighters to the charismatic war leaders is the beginning of the rise of 
warlords.  Additionally, several war leaders possibly have bases of support outside of 
Chechnya through either the black market or foreign influence within their organization.  
This makes them even more independent of the central government.  Without strong 
government control over the selection, training, and promotion of leaders the military 
becomes a confederation of militias that may or may not support the state’s desires. 
Lacking complete authority over its military commanders decision making by the 
government in regards to security policy can only be through consensus, and the 
government can never be certain if its military commanders are supporting the state’s 
goals.  An example of this is the rift that developed between Chechen President 
Mashkhadov and Basayev.  When asked about the rift Basayev has stated, “My 
relationship with Mashkhadov is tolerable, although he was unhappy with my going to 
Dagestan.  Mashkadov and I agree on some things and disagree on many others.”117  A 
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quite unbelievable exchange when viewed from a modern western perspective, but not at 
all unusual for a society that is rooted in pre-state egalitarianism and elder leadership. 
A decentralized system of control can, however, be advantageous when engaged 
in combat.  First, one doctrine does not dominate so, in essence, the Russian’s have to be 
prepared to fight different leaders in different ways.  Additionally, the absence of a 
dominant doctrine plus the need to win in order to preserve their society encourages the 
Chechens to think out of the box.  The Chechens have shown an ability to adapt not only 
tactics but also technology to fit their needs rather than the western paradigm of fitting 
new technology to old methods with the hope of increasing their effectiveness.   On the 
negative side decentralization can be fatal to the insurgency if the insurgents either lose 
the initiative or are drawn into fighting Russian strengths.  Avoiding Russian strength is 
one reason the Chechens have always conceded the region of Chechnya north of the 
Terek River to the Russians; they cannot fight effectively against them on the steppes.  
This dichotomy may also be a result of the lowlanders being more willing to seek 
accommodation with the Russians than the highlanders.    
3.  Organization 
The Chechen military and militia forces basic unit of organization is the hunter-
killer groups of 10-12 fighters, which can be split into two teams as needed but will 
always operate in support of each other. 118  These “squads” ideally comprise two RPG 
gunners, two machine gunners, and two snipers with the remainder being either riflemen 
or ammunition bearers depending on the amount of weapons available.  Three hunter-
killer groups plus a support squad comprise a cell.  Support in a cell varies, but can 
include medical personnel, drivers, and possibly additional snipers, or ammunition 
bearers depending on the mission and weapons availability.  Three cells are grouped 
together into a 75-100 man unit that is usually equipped with a mortar and a dedicated 
command and planning cell.119  
Much of what is known about the Chechen military organization and operations 
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Published in April 2000 in the Independent Military Review the diary has been accepted 
as genuine by analysts of the war.  The diary describes the organization of the military 
forces as including: 
1. A single commander with a staff, and several field commanders. 
2. Field commanders control two 500-man (approximate numbers) units, one 
active and one reserve. 
3. The 500-man unit is split into detachments of 100 men. 
4. Detachments are split into three fighting groups; a central full readiness group 
that remains with the commander [a combination of a staff, praetorian guard 
and a reserve]; a 20 man group that includes reconnaissance, mining 
specialists and snipers; support group which are the friends and allies of the 
commander and remain in their homes.120  
Several salient points can be drawn from the descriptions of the military organization.  
First, the active and reserve groupings supports the contention that the Chechen wars can 
be viewed as “commuter wars”121 where teip members rotate in and out of battle; second, 
the overall number of fighter can be quickly expanded through the support groups, and 
that the members of the hunter-killer groups reside in the support group; third that the 
fighters are physically supported by the network of kinship and religious relationships 
while engaged in fighting, and that units are organized on the basis of a particular region 
and retain close ties with their kinsman and co-religionists during the campaign; finally 
this flexible organization allows the Chechens to rapidly shift from guerrilla operations  
to more conventional operations and back confounding Russian attempts at effectively 
countering the Chechens.  The Chechen tactical organization moves and thinks flexibly.  
Unencumbered by an organization and a doctrine suited to a high technology war against 
NATO and having an intimate knowledge of the areas in which they are fighting the 
Chechen fighters are frequently able to counter or pre-empt Russian moves.  While not 
true guerrillas they also cannot be accurately classified as a conventional force.   
B.  WEAPONS AND TACTICS  
The Chechens are equipped with Soviet weapons that were either abandoned by 
the Russians as they withdrew from the Caucasus prior to 1994, captured during the war, 
or bought from Russian soldiers during the war.  The use of Russian weapons provides 
                                                 
120 Ibid, 66-68. 
121 Michael Specter, “Commuting Warriors in Chechnya,” New York Time., 1 February, 1995.  6.   
 54
for ammunition commonality with their enemy plus many fighters are familiar with these 
weapons.  The Chechens are mainly equipped with small arms, rocket propelled grenade 
(RPG) 7/16s, and mortars.  The RPG quickly became the weapon of choice in urban and 
mountain combat due to their effectiveness against the lightly armored tops and rear of 
Russian armored fighting vehicles.  Additionally, RPGs were used as mortars, firing over 
buildings, as an area weapon against troops targets, and with effect against Russian 
helicopters.122  The main source of fire support has been mortars, however Russian 
artillery and GRAD multiple rocket launchers (MRL) have been captured and used 
against the Russians.  Reliance on man-portable weapons provides the Chechens a 
mobility advantage over the Russians in their chosen battlegrounds of cities and 
mountains as well as being more easily infiltrated through Russian lines and cached in 
Russian occupied areas.   
While combat has focused on the Chechen use of man-portable weapons, heavier 
weapons have been available to the Chechens as 12-15 tanks, a substantial amount of 
artillery as well as BMPs, anti aircraft guns, and the MRLs already discussed fell into 
Chechen hands during the initial phases of the Russian invasion.123  Most of the heavy 
equipment was used against the Russians in the December 1994-January 1995 period and 
subsequently either abandoned or destroyed.  A unit of five tanks was kept operational 
and fought throughout the campaign.  Many anti-aircraft guns were taken to the 
mountains and emplaced to provide protection for Chechen camps, and have been used in 
ambushes. 
Tactically the Chechens outfought the Russians.  They were better prepared, their 
tactics better matched the environment, and they made better use of non-standard 
supporting arms; psychological warfare and information operations.  The Chechens main 
operational weakness is their lack of ability to conduct a sustained campaign either in 
Chechnya or within Russia.  This disadvantage plus the lack of substantial outside 
support makes an extended insurgency likely.   
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The preferred tactic of the Chechens, like that of all pre-state societies, is the 
ambush.  The advantages of the ambush are the preservation of the insurgent’s strength 
while inflicting physical and psychological damage to the enemy.  The Chechens, 
particularly in urban areas, modernized the ambush.  The highly networked and cohesive 
units combined modern communications means with the ambush to conduct a fluid non-
linear style of warfare that has been named swarming.  Swarming is, 
A seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic 
way to strike from all directions at a particular point or points by means of 
a sustainable pulsing of force and or fire, close in as well as from stand-off 
positions…swarming will work best-perhaps it will only work—if its is 
designed mainly around the deployments of myriad, small, dispersed, 
networked maneuver units.124  
A typical Chechen anti-armor ambush was organized around at least two hunter-
killer squads broken down into teams centered on the RPGs and machine guns. 
The sniper and machine gunner would pin down Russian supporting 
infantry while the anti-tank gunner would engage the armored target.  The 
teams deployed at ground level, and also in second and third stories, and 
in basements.  Normally 5-6 hunter-killer teams attacked an armored 
vehicle in unison.125 
For fighting within buildings the Chechens adopted the concept of “vertical 
pincers” where the Chechens would occupy parts of a basement and portions of the 
second or third floors.  The Chechens would attack the Russians on the floors between 
their two forces by fire, and then extract themselves from the building leaving the 
Russians engaged in an intramural firefight.126  The urban tactics adopted by the 
Chechens were equally effective in the mountains where, as in Afghanistan, the Russian 
forces remained road bound in the valleys giving the Chechens, with their greater 
mobility on the mountains and ridges, the same advantage they possessed fighting from 
buildings.  
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1.  Psychological and Information Operations 
 The Chechens made better use of psychological and information operations than 
the Russians.  Furthermore, the Chechens were unhindered by a command structure 
inculcated in Soviet ways, saw the righteousness of their actions, and could draw on the 
rhetorical support of those in the west that were against the continuation of a Russian 
empire.  The Chechens’ psychological and information operations were successful on the 
tactical and operational level, but while raising the level of awareness of their plight in 
the west did not gain western support, recognition for their cause, or create a lasting 
peace becoming a strategic failure.     
a.  Psychological Operations 
The Chechens have also made effective use of psychological operations.  
The four most prevalent uses of psychological operations by the Chechens included 
ruses, with Chechens dressing as Russian soldiers, members of the Red Cross, or other 
NGOs in order to gain access to Russian positions. The grisly treatment of Russian dead 
was the second prevalent operation.  The booby-trapping of bodies, although denied by 
several Chechen leaders appears to have been a common occurrence as was the 
decapitating of the bodies of Russian soldiers and the staking of their heads along 
Russian lines of communication.  Additionally, Russian dead and wounded were hung 
near Chechen positions so Russian troops would have to fire through their comrades to 
hit Chechen positions.127 
More insidious was the threat of nuclear terrorism against Russia proper.  
While never carried out, its possibility was demonstrated when Shamil Basayev arranged 
for a container of medical grade radioactive Cesium 138 to be placed in a Moscow Park.  
The act was announced to the local media, which sent a reporter to find the material.  The 
ease with which this was accomplished frightened the Russian population.  This fear was 
enhanced when the Chechens claimed to be in possession of several nuclear warheads 
that had previously been stored on Chechen territory.  While viewed as an empty threat 
by the Russian government, the possible use of WMD continues today.   
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The last and most successful use of psychological warfare has been the 
continuing threat to turn the separatist struggle into a religious war by creating an Islamic 
state in the Caucasus from which a terrorist campaign against Russia can be launched.  
This threat, on a receptive Russian audience, has caused the Russians to classify the 
Chechen insurgency as religiously based and prone to the use of terrorism.  With the 
second Chechen campaign taking on a more Islamic character than the first is seen as 
proof by the Russians that an Islamicized insurgency intent on attacking Russia and the 
West has been established in the Caucasus.  Despite Russian propaganda, the West, until 
the 11 September attacks on the United States, was not inclined to believe the validity of 
the Russian claims.  However, since September 11th the West, while not fully accepting 
Russian claims, appears to be more receptive to them. 
b.  Information Operations  
Chechen propaganda would not have been as effective on Russia or the 
West was it not for their sophisticated use of information operations to gain a clear 
advantage over the Russians.  The Chechens were operationally successful in their media 
campaign as they garnered great private support from the West.  This support included 
strong NGO pressure on the Russian leadership, something they were not used to and did 
not know how to handle.  Although tactically successful, the information campaign, like 
the psychological campaign, was strategically unsuccessful because it did not result in 
support or recognition from Western states.   
The Chechens used the media during the first Russian campaign to sow 
fear in the Russian people while winning the “hearts and minds” of Western citizens.  
Their success showed how the Chechens were able to use non-standard tactics and 
techniques to great effect.  As John Arquilla points out, “The [media] campaign itself also 
emphasizes the point that the Chechens saw the battle space in broad non-linear terms a 
key principle of information age conflict.”128  Additionally, being Russian speakers, the 
Chechens were able to influence Russian actions by using radios to mimic higher 
command echelons causing Russian units to engage in combat with each other, thereby 
increasing an already high fratricide rate.  Conversely, when speaking in their native 
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language, Chechen radio messages were almost undecipherable to the Russians as few 
Russians speak Chechen.   
The Chechen use of communications equipment was highly effective and 
shows their ability to adapt available technology to the military situation.  They used 
hand-held radios complete with repeaters to allow for communication throughout 
Chechnya.  Mobile television transmitters as well as short wave radios were used to 
provide command and control for the military forces and civilian auxiliaries as well as to 
transmit propaganda and disinformation to the Russian civilians and military forces in 
and around Chechnya.129   
During the first Chechen campaign, counter to common perception, there 
was no use of cellular phones as there was no established cellular network in the region. 
The Chechens did use INMARSAT and Iridium satellite phones toward the end of the 
first campaign, but mainly to communicate outside of Chechnya.  By 1999 a cellular 
network had been established in Chechnya complete with repeaters and a relay station in 
Ingushetia, which allowed each field commander to link between 20-60 fighters into his 
own cellular phone network facilitating command and control.  Chechen short wave radio 
enthusiasts maintained this system.130 
By all accounts, the Chechen command and control network proved to be 
extensive, simple and highly effective.  It allowed leaders to exercise command and 
control over small dispersed cells of fighters more effectively than in any previous 
insurgency.  It also allowed the hunter-killer groups to operate semi-autonomously while 
facilitating swarming tactics by being able to draw dispersed elements together for an 
attack, and then allowing the detailed coordination needed for the attack to occur in near 
real-time. 
C.  OUTSIDE SUPPORT   
A final aspect of the Chechen insurgency has been its success in gaining financial 
or physical support from non-western and non-state sources.  The Chechens appear to 
have increasingly turned to crime and Islamic countries for support.  While the 
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insurgency has undoubtedly benefited from monetary and weapons support provided by 
the Islamic world, it is more likely that Chechens involved in the smuggling of drugs, 
arms, and other black market activities supplied the majority of the money and supplies 
the insurgency required.  Overall outside support, including that from Muslim countries, 
has been minimal.  What is received from the Islamic world most likely goes to support 
the foreign fighters in the region. 
The issue of foreign fighters in Chechnya has become increasingly important 
since the end of the first campaign.  The numbers of foreign fighters present in Chechnya 
ranges from a few dozen to between 700-1000 with western sources claiming around 200 
in the region at any one time.131  There is little doubt that the conflict has attracted 
foreign fighters.  However, not all are Islamic, and many appear to be westerners or from 
states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union.  Reports of British, Chinese, French as 
well as Russians, Ukrainians, female snipers (the White Stockings) from the Baltic 
States, and Armenian Christians abound.  Arab fighters linked to the former Taliban 
regime and Osama bin Laden, as well as Muslims from Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and the 
Sudan are claimed to have fought in Chechnya.132  Despite strenuous Russian claims that 
foreign fighters are present, only four captured fighters have been displayed as being 
foreigners, and of these four only one, a Dane of Iraqi descent, has been acknowledged 
by his respective government.133  The inability to present proof of foreign activity makes 
the Russian claims seem dubious.  What is known is that Khattab has attracted a fairly 
large group of foreigners into his organization of which approximately 100 have 
supported the training of Chechens134 while the others have supported his actions against 
the Russians in Dagestan.  Regardless of the actual numbers of foreign fighters, it 
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remains a small percentage of the total number fighting against the Russians.  
Additionally, these fighters, with the exception of Khattab, do not appear to have been 
given a leading combat role against the Russians.  It is also apparent that the foreign 
fighters have rotated in and out of Chechnya and, except for a small cadre, around 
Khattab appear to be in Chechnya for the adventure. 135   
D.  CONCLUSION  
 The Chechens have been able to use their experience in the Soviet military and 
the training they received during the Caucasian disputes of the early 1990s to build an 
effective fighting force.  The Chechen military is comfortable fighting as guerrillas, but 
also as more conventional units albeit using mainly unconventional tactics.  The 
Chechens have also demonstrated a surprising ability to transition between the two when 
needed.  The Chechens exhibit the tendencies of pre-state societies that organize for war; 
they organize military units along social lines, provide informal military training to the 
entire population through the family, and use war leaders that come from within the 
kinship group comprising the military unit, and have charismatic appeal plus have 
demonstrated success against the Russians.  Operationally, the similarities with pre-state 
societies continue as the Chechen’s employ the ambush as their basic tactical maneuver. 
They also use assassination, kidnapping, and bombing or mining against the Russians, 
tactics that straddle the contemporary boundary between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, 
though they would have been common in pre-state societies at war.   
The Chechens have demonstrated ease with technology that allows them to 
employ it in ways many westerners would think laughable, such as the use of television 
to transmit orders and the creation of mobile television transmitters and studios to 
facilitate this. The ability to blend technology with guerrilla warfare enhances the 
Chechens effectiveness and increases their ability to affect the Russians morale.  Drawing 
on an intimate knowledge of the Russian psyche, the Chechen’s have bee able to target 
Russian society effectively while remaining almost immune from Russian attempts at 
splitting the resistance from its popular support.  The strong anti-Russian sentiment, 
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ethnic homogeneity, and most importantly, the tight religious and kinship links between 
the fighters and their supporters make Russian propaganda mostly ineffective. 
Unable to defeat the Chechens, and under increasing world pressure to reach a 
settlement with them, the Russians have attempted to make an issue of the presence of 
foreign fighters and the Islamic character of the insurgency to show the west that the 
Russians are acting in everyone’s best interest. Undeniably, foreigners are present. 
However, with the exception of Khattab and a small cadre around him, foreign fighters 
appear to be a rather inconsequential part of the insurgency.  The radical Islamic 
character of the foreign Muslims supporting the insurgency does not appear to have made 
inroads into the predominantly Sufi, anti-foreign character of the majority of Chechens.   
Overall Olga Oliker has best captured the character of the Chechen insurgency in 
his Rand report. 
Whatever their outside support the Chechen rebels proved that they were 
not, as some had believed, random bands of irregulars.  Neither were they 
as General Troshev, the second in command of the Combined Force, said 
‘a well prepared and professional army.’  Rather they were a well-
prepared reasonably well-equipped guerrilla force defending its own 
territory.136 
The key to the insurgency is not the foreign fighter or Islamic support rather it is the 
strength of the Chechen society, their vehement anti-Russian stance, and their pre-state 
social construct, and their ability to assimilate technology as needed into an effective 
albeit not thoroughly modern insurgency.  
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V.  WAR 
Jokhar Dudayev, elected president on 27 October 1991, officially declared 
Chechnya independent on 1 November.137  Chechnya’s independence did not escape 
notice in Moscow, and on 8 November Russia declared the election invalid and 
implemented a state of emergency in Chechnya.  Moscow’s confrontation with President 
Dudayev was handled ineptly leading to a strengthening of Dudayev’s power, and 
transforming him into a national hero, the liberator of Chechnya.   
By mid-1992, a nascent Chechen state structure was in existence, and this 
structure did not contain any institutions that could be construed as Islamic.  
Additionally, the constitution adopted during 1992 was entirely free of ethnic and 
religious particularism.138  In an attempt to create a strong government, which is 
anathema to the Chechens, President Dudayev centralized the government, and populated 
it with members of his teip.  Tensions that arose over the centralized and nepotistic 
character of the government helped hinder the developing civil society.  However, the 
Russian economic embargo and the returning of skilled Russian workers to Russia proper 
had a devastating effect on Chechen civil society and its economy.  As the Chechen 
economy collapsed, what there was of civil society collapsed with it.  Societal collapse 
led to the rise of nationalism, specifically anti-Russian feelings, that rallied the nation.  In 
the place of the collapsed economy there was a rise in banditry in the region as well as 
increased smuggling and kidnapping.  The clan structure combined with Islam remained 
as the only social structure in society and became the organizational basis of the Chechen 
insurgency.    
While working to create a viable state, President Dudayev continued to work 
toward the goal of building a Caucasian Federation, which would be dominated by 
Chechnya and himself.  Dudayev sponsored a Congress of the Confederation of the 
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Mountain Peoples in October 1992139 where he urged all Caucasian nations to resist 
Russian troops and to strive for independence.  Put off by Chechen chauvinism and  
fearing Chechen dominance, most Caucasian nations shied away from the Chechen 
stance.140  Despite a lack of support, Dudayev organized Chechen “volunteer” fighters, 
led by Shamil Basayev, to fight for the creation of a Confederation of the Mountain 
Peoples, and, interestingly, support Russian interests in the region.  Basayev’s 
involvement with the Russians during this period has given rise to speculation that 
through at least the mid 1990s he was an agent of the Russians, a theory that was given 
added credence when General Alexander Lebed stated bluntly that Basayev had long 
been a KGB informer who, he added, retained “levers of influence” in Moscow.141  If 
true this might partly explain the Chechen and, in particular, his own successes in 
Chechnya.   
A.  WAR  
The Russians have equated the use of terrorism in the war with the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  However, what was really at work was not radical Islam, but rather a 
strong nationalism and ingrained hatred of the Russians channeled into the only strategic 
action available, terror.   
1.  Chechnya I 
Basayev returned to Chechnya in 1994 because of Russian attempts to overthrow 
Dudayev and became the insurgent government’s leading military commander.  His 
reputation allowed him to easily organize an elite unit of volunteers.  Basayev supported 
the secular government of Dudayev because it maintained the support of the Chechen 
population, although he personally disliked Dudayev, and from mid 1994 until December 
1994, he supported operations against Chechen lowlanders organized by the Russians to 
overthrow the Dudayev government.  After the insurgents were defeated, the Russians 
committed forces in December 1994 to retake Chechnya.  Basayev and other Chechen 
war leaders operated against the Russian advance using guerrilla tactics, while falling 
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back toward Grozny.  During the subsequent Russian attack on Grozny, the Chechens 
defeated the initial Russian attempts at taking the city by successfully combining guerrilla 
and conventional tactics.    
After the Chechens were pushed out of Grozny they began a successful guerrilla 
campaign in the mountains of the southern districts.  This campaign was punctuated by 
several strategic acts of terrorism; among them the planting of the Cesium 138 already 
discussed, Basayev’s raid on Budenovsk which culminated in a humiliated Russian 
government openly negotiating with the rebels, and several lesser actions including the 
hijacking of a Turkish ferry by Turks sympathetic to the Chechen cause, and a raid by 
Salmon Ruduyev on the town of Kizlar in Dagestan.   This period of guerrilla war drove 
the Russians from the verge of victory to being forced to establish fortified garrisons, 
move about Chechnya only as part of a large, heavily armed force, use indiscriminant 
firepower and overwhelming force whenever operating against Chechen insurgents, and 
establish filtration camps to separate the male population from possible contact with the 
insurgents.  These techniques failed, and, by mid 1996, the Chechen forces were again 
operating in a quasi-conventional manner, which culminated in the attack and defeat of 
the Russians in Grozny during August 1996.   
The 1994-1996 war with Russia ended with a truce signed in August 1996.  Later 
that year Aslan Mashkhadov, the popular Minister of Defense of the Chechen state, was 
overwhelmingly elected to replace President Dudayev who was killed in the latter stages 
of the first campaign.  Mashkhadov beat his main opponent, Shamil Basayev, and 
received 59 percent of the vote.142  Fortunately for the Chechens, Mashkhadov and 
Basayev respect each other, and Basayev, the purported radical Islamist, entered into the 
secular government of Mashkhadov serving at times as the prime minister.  During the 
next three years, Chechnya continued to totter on the brink of collapse.  Economically 
ruined and its state institutions inoperable, a void of state control appeared into which 
entered warlordism.  Many saw warlordism in general and the central role Khattab has 
played in Chechen military operations since the truce, as proof that the Chechen state had 
been captured by a violent Islamic organization intent on exporting terrorism.  What is 
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being seen in Chechnya however, is not unlike that seen in other failed third world states, 
and is not an Islamic phenomenon.  Rather, it develops from the inability of a state rooted 
in tribal loyalties and egalitarian rule to monopolize the use of coercion within its 
boundaries.  These weak states do not have the ability to force compliance with the 
central government’s desires and decrees and strongly armed alternate centers of power, 
in the Chechen case the teip, arise and compete with each other as well as the central 
government for control of the territory.  These warlords maintain power through the 
social and economic exploitation of society by force, terror, and the use of organized 
crime.   
2.  Chechnya II 
After the first Chechen war ended, tensions between Chechnya and Russia 
remained high.  The tensions manifested themselves over Dagestan, which had become 
the center for the Caucasus’s Wahabbi movement during Perestroika.  The region of 
strongest Wahabbist beliefs is in the central mountains along the western border with 
Chechnya and along the southern border with Azerbaijan.  While small in number, it 
appears the Dagestani Wahabbists are capitalizing on the importance of Dagestan to 
Caucasian Islam and are intent on spreading their influence within Dagestan and if 
possible to Azerbaijan and Chechnya. 
 a.  Dagestan 
 The Russian’s second Chechen campaign can be said to have 
started in Dagestan. Between the middle of 1997 and the October 1999 invasion of 
Chechnya a cross border guerrilla conflict took place in the mountainous region 
straddling the southern Chechen –Dagestan border.  There is little doubt Chechen forces 
were involved, as part of this region is home to the Akkintsy Chechens, who are 
Chechens living in Dagestan whose ancestral lands were taken over by the Laks after 
their deportation and the subsequent redistribution of their lands.143  It is not certain that 
the Chechens initiated the combat.  However, the true issue over the guerrilla conflict in 
Dagestan is whether Chechens commanded by Shamil Basayev or Khattab fostered 
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unrest in order to intervene expanding the conflict into a region the Russians view as 
strategically essential.  
It appears the Dagestani Wahhabi’s did in fact rise up to create a small 
Wahabbi enclave within Dagestan.  It was not apparent if this enclave wanted to succeed 
or form a union with Chechnya.  However, the Russians took quick and heavy-handed 
action against it.  The August and September 1997 incursions into Dagestan by fighters 
led by Khattab appears to have been in response to the Russian encirclement and shelling 
of the villages of Ansalla, Raklotta, Akhino, and Miarso in the Botlikh region of 
Dagestan.  The intention of the Chechen incursion was to allow the villagers to escape the 
encirclement, and, once that was accomplished, the Chechens withdrew.  Despite the 
denials by the Chechen civilian leader Aslan Mashkhadov, the incursion is viewed as an 
attempt by the Chechens to foment rebellion in Dagestan and engineer its eventual 
succession from Russia.  When it is considered that between August 31st and September 
16th 1999, approximately the period of the incursion into Dagestan, five bombs were 
exploded in Dagestan and Russia, a systematic campaign of terror focused on weakening 
the Russian hold on the Caucasus could easily be inferred. 144 
The August-September incursions to assist Dagestani separatists was 
followed up in December by a raid, led by Khattab against the 136th Armored Brigade’s 
cantonment area near Buinsk Dagestan.  This incursion was undoubtedly meant to be 
provocative and reportedly included a large percentage of the available Arab fighters.  
The Chechen civilian leadership again denied involvement.  Shamil Basayev also denied 
involvement and stated, “Chechnya was absolutely not interested in fanning tensions on 
its borders…we don’t need to travel 200 km to put two Russian tanks out of action.  If we 
needed to do this, we could have gone to Khasavyurt…” Raduyev, another military 
leader, also denied involvement adding, “The entire Army was located in Chechnya  
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and…none took part in the incident at Buinsk.”145 
While undoubtedly these denials obfuscate the facts, it also points to 
another conclusion, that Khattab, while helping and supporting the Chechen resistance, is 
interested in spreading an Islamic revolt, rather than fighting for Chechen independence 
from Russia.  Khattab has stated that he wants to replicate Imam Shamil’s Imamate, and 
he apparently sees himself filling the role of charismatic spiritual and military leader of 
the region.  He is able to attempt this because of a void of state authority within 
Chechnya, pockets of sympathetic peoples in Chechnya and Dagestan, and links to 
outside support.   
3.  Results of the War 
 As the second Chechen war continues, many such as Anatol Lieven think we 
may be seeing the Afghanization of Chechnya as the rise of warlordism has created the 
appearance of overall lawlessness.  Lieven and others foresee the continued degeneration 
of society and postulate that this state is bound to bring about the rise of radical leaders.  
These authors see the rise of organizations such as the Taliban not as an anomaly, but 
rather as the result of a failed and lawless Islamic state.  While true that continued war 
has destroyed Chechnya, it is an over statement to conclude that a homogenous nation 
will Balkanize, causing radical religious leaders to gain power in a state that has 
demonstrated its desire for a secular government.  While true that the dissolution of 
society, economic collapse, and war has brought lawlessness the underlying social fabric 
of society, the teip, and Sufism each having a stronger following than radical Islam, 
together can form the basis of a reformed society once the fighting ends.   
B.  CONCLUSION 
The paradox of Chechnya easily comes to light when its history and recent 
operations are viewed.  First, while desiring independence and exhibiting strong 
nationalism, the Chechens have little use for modern state institutions.  Second, 
Chechnya remains primordial; it is a strong clan based society whose current unifying 
force is kinship, hatred for the Russians, and only then nationalism.  Chechen society, 
despite its contradictions, remains strong.  From the socio-military viewpoint the link 
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between society and the military is readily apparent.  Chechnya is an example of a 
networked society that rises to the challenges offered by outside repression.  The hatred 
for the oppressor is an integral part of their identity, and provides cohesiveness to the 
society, which tends to become more loosely associated minus the external threat.   
The case study shows how the component parts of society and history have 
shaped Chechen culture.  These components, the extended family, teip loyalty, 
egalitarianism and elder leadership, and hatred for the Russians plus the proclivity for the 
Chechens to fall under the sway of charismatic leaders have had a decisive impact on the 
organization of society.  Chechen society though outwardly modern, remains at its 
foundation decidedly pre-state, and is a perfect example of a cohesive hybrid society 
The Chechen case further shows how an outwardly modern society that is rooted 
in a pre-state culture will quickly devolve toward its roots when removed from or rejected 
by modern society.  The hybrid state results as this devolution brings with it the legacies 
of modernity: religion, political ideologies, technology, and modern social norms.  The 
mixing of these modern legacies with traditional socio-political norms creates a society 
that is highly unstable and torn by internal rivalries and contradictions.  The hybrid 
society is characterized by a weak central government that is challenged throughout the 
“state’s” territory by warlords, and high levels of violence, more so than in pre-state 
societies due to the use of modern weapons systems directed at those outside the social 
group.  Economically, the hybrid society runs on the exploitation and discrimination of 
its people and the warlords, if not the state itself, is funded through criminal activities. 
Militarily, hybrid societies are not strong, but they are extremely resilient and can 
defeat a modern, highly technical military force.  Organizationally, the decentralized 
nature of the Chechen forces, those nominally “national” plus those controlled by the 
warlords, suffer from the same defects that are exhibited by a decentralized, egalitarian 
society namely weak leadership and a lack of unit discipline.  Likewise, the nominally 
“national” leadership has no mechanism with which it can exert positive control over its 
senior commanders and eradicate individual agendas amongst these men.  Overall, the 
system of weak leadership plus the need for strong war leaders creates a vacuum into 
which charismatic leaders step nullifying any pretext of national control. 
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Operationally, hybrid military forces are superior to western forces within their 
limited operational spectrum.  Their main strength lies in the hybrid’s ability to employ 
modern technology against its enemies as well as its ability to operate outside the 
conventions governing war, which continually restrains its modern foe. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In fact, there are solid military reasons why modern regular forces 
are all but useless for fighting what is fast becoming the dominant 
form of war in our age.  Perhaps the most important reason is the 
need to look after technology on which the force depends…146  
The Chechen case highlights several salient points regarding hybrid societies and 
war, however, Chechnya is an example of only one form that a hybrid society may take.  
Another form characterized by Afghanistan and Somalia has multiple fault lines within 
the hybrid society and is not looked at in this thesis.  The general traits of both types of 
hybrid societies and warfare are similar, but more complex in the latter form.     
A.  CONCLUSION  
While the focus of this thesis is on hybrid military forces, it has been 
demonstrated that, like in pre-state society, there is little distinction between the hybrid 
society and military.  The salient points of this thesis address socio-political issues that 
impact the military organization and doctrine of hybrid military forces. 
1.  Political 
Politically, two main points can be drawn from the devolution that creates hybrid 
forces.  First, as a society devolves it brings with it modern religious and political 
theories, and social mores.  These are then mixed with traditional social organization and 
mores.  This hybridization creates dislocation similar to that caused by modernization, 
altering society in ways that affects its ability to regain the comfort and security thought 
to have existed in the pre-state era.  Second, many hybrid societies outwardly appear to 
be based on a dominant religion or ideology.  However, this religion or ideology has been 
altered and bears little resemblance to the base religion or ideology, and makes 
categorizing hybrid societies into the commonly accepted Western definitions of 
authoritarian, democratic, Islamic or secular for example, problematic.  Islam and its role 
in Chechen society is an example of this.   
Socially, hybrid societies operate within a gray zone between modernity and pre-
state.  Structurally most hybrid societies create and use modern bureaucratic structures.  
                                                 
146 Martin Van Creveld,  The Transformation of War.  (New York:  The Free Press, 1991).  118. 
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However, these structures tend to be less stable and operate within traditional vice 
modern norms.  Three salient points are essential to understanding hybrid societies.   
1. Hybrid societies appear anarchic and unjust when viewed through a Western or 
modern lens.   
However, when viewed in the context of the society’s traditional mores with an 
understanding of the role pre-state institutions play in that particular society, the hybrid is 
not as anarchic as it first appears.  Furthermore, the imposition of Western style values 
and institutions can have a highly destabilizing effect on society as norms and the 
institutions to inculcate and administer them are imported into the society rather than 
grown from within society.   
2. War and a high level of inter-personal violence are accepted as normal in most 
hybrid societies.   
This is a direct link to the pre-state roots of these societies and helps explain the 
apparent willingness of hybrid societies to set few, if any, boundaries to military 
activities.  Hybrid societies practice a form of pre-state warfare, which recognizes few, if 
any, of the modern limitations on warfare.  For example little distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants is made, kidnapping is commonplace, and massacres are 
common in the period following a victory.  Similarly, the concept of law or international 
conventions regulating war, when even acknowledged by the hybrid society, is either 
couched in terms that tend to justify their actions, or dismisses these conventions as not 
applicable because they are Western or Christian in origin.  The debate over which is 
proper the Palestinian suicide terrorists killing Israeli citizens or the Israeli soldiers 
accidentally killing Palestinian civilians in refugee camps is a case in point. 
3. Hybrid societies, while emphasizing their traditional roots, create and use state 
institutions and exploit modern technology that suits their needs.   
As seen in the case of Chechnya, the Chechens are a modern people who wish to 
live in a more traditional manner.  They are not a lost people or throwbacks to an ancient 
era, and as a modern people they have been able to choose what aspects of modernity 
they wish to include in their society.  The result is a tribal style society that has a nominal 
central government along with nascent bureaucratic institutions, which are used by the 
hybrid society to interact with more modern societies.  Few societies attempt a radical 
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elimination of modernity, as did the Khmer Rouge and Taliban.  Most choose to adapt 
technology to be useful in more traditional settings.   
As societies devolve, they incorporate technology at different levels.  Technology 
is usually incorporated into society at a level that allows the leadership to retain control 
while controlling its people.  In hybrid societies while the leadership may have access to 
computers, and cellular phones, and the military might have access to modern weapons, 
air defense systems, radars, and modern communications society as whole likely does 
not.     
2.  Military  
The socio-political characteristics of hybrid societies leave a decided impact on 
the structure and doctrine of the hybrid military.  These characteristics create the norms 
from which the military is created.  Without a doubt each hybrid society develops a 
unique military culture with its own organizational and doctrinal tenets.  This fact is 
difficult for modern intelligence agencies and military forces to accept because it requires 
them to have a detailed knowledge of individual societies to understand military forces, 
and prevents the practice, common in Western forces since the initiation of the Cold War, 
of templating your enemy by analyzing the one dominant military philosophy and 
doctrine.  Four salient points can be made regarding hybrid military forces.   
4. Military organization reflects the level of socio-political development, and a 
society’s military theory and doctrine reflects the prevailing societal norms.   
The common Western view of hybrid forces as being individually ill disciplined 
and suffering from a lack of training is drawn from the western view that their society is 
anarchic.  However, this is not borne out in all cases.  In the case of Chechnya, Anatol 
Lieven has observed that  
Compared to what I have seen of the Afghan Mujahideen, the Georgians, 
and various other forces, the care and professionalism with which the 
Chechens handled their weapons was indeed highly impressive (no doubt 
because of Soviet military training).  Above all, they did not wave them 
around, they did not fire them in the air for fun, and kept their safety 
catches on when not in action.147   
                                                 
147 Lieven (1998), 118. 
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As the study of Chechnya bears out, decentralized, egalitarian, and clan based 
society will create a similar style of military organization.  The inability of Western states 
to comprehend the socio-political ramifications of hybridization makes it difficult for 
them to understand the military organization and doctrine of a hybrid society and places 
Western forces at a disadvantage when conducting operational planning against or 
engaging a hybrid force.  
5. The strengths of hybrid forces do not match the Western conceptions of military 
strength and are mainly discounted by the west.  The components of hybrid strengths are: 
• Ideas. 
• Individuals, the charismatic leader.   
• Society and military can absorb tremendous punishment. 
• Strong belief in their cause. 
• Decentralized tactics, swarming being one example. 
The strengths of hybrid warfare lends itself to the use of guerrilla tactics, which 
technologically advanced and highly bureaucratic forces have a difficult time countering.  
Hybrid’s view warfare as total because, in their view, the society is fighting for its 
existence, and this creates a strong belief in their cause.  As a struggle for existence, the 
hybrid society will use all tactics at its disposal including kidnapping, control of the 
enemy’s food or water supply, massacres, and blurring the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants bringing the charge against them, by modern states, that 
the hybrid society is a terrorist state.    
6. Hybrid forces can effectively incorporate technologically advanced systems into 
their force structure and strategy, and use these systems in ways that are beyond the 
intended employment parameters.   
The Chechen example strongly brings this point out.  Their use of the modern 
media as a means of command and control and spreading disinformation or propaganda is 
a unique and effective way to control and inform your people while spreading 
propaganda to the enemy combatants and non-combatants.  Hybrid forces have 
transformed the use of RPGs from a hand held anti-tank weapons into hand held rocket 
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mortars, anti-personnel weapons, and anti-helicopter weapons showing their ingenuity 
under fire.   
 Hybrid’s use of technology in ways not anticipated by its creators is a 
consequence of adapting an available technology to fit a specific need instead of the 
Western method of designing a new system to fit a perceived requirement.  In the West, 
once this new system is adopted and incorporated into the doctrine, it becomes difficult to 
use the system in ways not anticipated before its adoption, as this will become a non-
doctrinal use and discouraged.   A seminal example of this is the increasing availability of 
communications assets, computers, and other information management tools that are 
applied to a fundamentally unaltered military force structure. 
7. Asymmetry in combat is not completely a reflection of differing warfighting 
capabilities or styles, but also one of societal norms and acceptance of international 
norms.   
The asymmetry in warfighting styles revolves around the increasing reliance on 
technology in the modern military force which makes it easier for hybrid forces to deliver 
unexpected blows by using techniques and methods discarded by the modern forces.   
Essentially, modern and hybrid forces operate on different planes with each having a 
distinct advantage within its warfare niche.  However, only the modern state’s prestige is 
at stake making it easier for the hybrid force to damage the modern state’s credibility.  
Modern states need to learn that combat against hybrid forces entails targeting the 
enemy’s strategy and strengths, not merely applying a doctrine designed to defeat a 
different enemy with vastly different strengths.   
In most cases, civilized soldiers have defeated primitive warriors only 
when they adopted the latter’s tactics.  In the history of European 
expansion soldiers repeatedly had to abandon their civilized techniques 
and weapons to win against even the most primitive opponents…In other 
words, not only were civilized military techniques incapable of defeating 
their primitive counterparts, but also in many cases the collaboration of 
primitive warriors was necessary because civilized soldiers were 
inadequate for the task.148   
                                                 
148 Keely, 74. 
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The impact of hybrid society and warfare creates a persistent disparity of forces 
between the West and the hybrid creating the rise of asymmetric responses to the West’s 
military superiority.  However, Western views that hybrid societies accept the prevailing 
Western norms exasperates the asymmetry because, as has been shown, hybrid norms are 
rooted in pre-state and not modern society.  Removing the hybrid’s asymmetric 
advantage will require the creation of a new paradigm of relations between Western 
states and non-state societies.  This new paradigm has to recognize that hybrid societies 
lie outside of the pluralistic security community, and its concept cannot be transferred to 
hybrid societies in their current form.  Additionally, the role of International 
Organizations and NGOs, themselves mainly non-state actors, has to be reevaluated.  
These organizations originally created to help foster state-to-state relations are 
increasingly irrelevant as conflict is increasingly between states and non-state or 
transnational actors.  Two specific recommendations are, 
8. Western states must recognize that the norms currently in existence within the 
Euro-Atlantic Community are alien to hybrid societies and place Western diplomats and 
forces at a disadvantage when negotiating or fighting hybrid societies.    
In fact, the extension of these norms to hybrid societies makes Western military 
forces especially vulnerable to the tactics used by hybrid forces as the restraint required 
of these forces is not reciprocated.   
9. It must be recognized that this new warfare paradigm foresees warfare becoming 
increasingly focused between states and non-states.   
This fact demands an overhaul of the assumptions that the Geneva and Hague 
conventions, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are based.  These 
current conventions are an outgrowth of nineteenth and early twentieth century state vs. 
state warfare and are increasingly irrelevant when applied to hybrid warfare because their 
focus is on the state rather than the non-state actor even if the non-state actor is violating 
the rules of warfare.149     
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS  
The increasing likelihood of hybrid warfare becoming the dominant form of 
combat facing the West demands that changes be made to the Western styles of warfare. 
                                                 
149 Claudia Rosett, “The Red Cross Needs to get Real.”  The Wall Street Journal.  23 January 2002. 
 76
Accessed via the Early Bird on 23 January 2003.  http://ebird.dtic.mil/jan2002/e20020123red.htm 
Specifically changes must be made to American military doctrine, training and 
organization to counter the threat from hybrid forces.  Within the American military 
changes must be made to the organization, doctrine and training of forces to more 
effectively operate against hybrid forces regardless of the international environment.   
10. Organizationally, the echelons of command above the Brigade need to be 
flattened by taking advantage of the United State’s advantage in computing, 
communications, and information management technologies.    
Flattening the military organization reduces redundant command levels creating 
less obtrusive oversight, less redundant command and staff actions, and increases the 
flow of information up the chain of command and guidance down.  The flattened 
organization when combined with more realistic, effective and decentralized training 
opens the way for increased initiative and adaptation at lower levels increasing the 
effectiveness of the United State’s smaller military force.   
11. It must be recognized that each conflict with a hybrid society will be unique.   
This demands that the services train and employ regionally educated and 
experienced staff officers and commanders at all levels as well as officers familiar with 
interagency operations.  True effectiveness will most likely mean the assignment of 
military officers as integral members to deployed cells from State or Justice Department, 
Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the assignment of 
members of other departments to lower levels within the Department of Defense. 
12. Force structure and doctrine must be oriented away from the highly mechanized 
model designed to fight the non-existent Soviet threat to Central Europe.  Additionally, 
the role and means of fire support must be reevaluated to make it more useful and 
effective in hybrid warfare.  
Doctrine must transition to focus on a more agile force supported by a heavy, 
mechanized and fire power intensive force. This more agile force will be manpower 
intensive and based on light foot mobile units that are trained to operate in a 
decentralized manner with minimal support.  Supporting arms doctrine must be revamped 
to support this decentralized forces and also operate with minimal support.  The doctrine 
must also place a greater emphasis on non-traditional supporting arms such as 
information and psychological operations, combining SOF with conventional forces, and 
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using constabulary or indigenous forces, which usually have a greater knowledge of the 
local area. The new doctrine must, 
• Use technology as an adjunct to, not a substitute for high quality forces. 
• Recognize the effectiveness and limitations of SOF, and explore the use of 
conventional forces operating in support of SOF. 
• Establish a standing Joint Task Force to implement greater integration 
between Expeditionary Forces, in order to arrive in an AO early with the 
ability to quickly begin sustained operations. 
• Recognize and train to use non-standard supporting arms to reduce the 
need for traditional fire support on the hybrid battlefield. 
• Become less prescriptive, less focused on tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs) and more focused on training sets of skills. 
The updated doctrine must then be inculcated in the force through training.   
13. The current training program must be revamped to offer more realistic and varied 
training to effectively imbue the tenants of small unit decentralized warfare.  Forces that 
fight together must train together  
Outside of entry-level training the use of routinization, the application of specific 
techniques in specific situations, for training needs to be abandoned.  Routinized training 
is unrealistic and the least efficient, but most measurable way to train forces.  Its basic 
flaw is that it trains individuals not to think, but to react to certain actions in specific 
ways.  These reactions have been drawn from a detailed study of ones enemy’s doctrine.  
However, when an enemy does not posses a comprehensive or written doctrine, or when 
the force does not know who it will be called on to fight, the TTPs developed for one 
enemy might not work on a different one.  To alleviate this problem skills, not specific 
techniques, need to be trained.  Along with training skills leaders need to be educated in 
tactical decision making through the extensive use to TDGs or sand table exercises. This 
education must then be tempered through extensive leadership experience involving 
numerous small unit free-play and live fire and maneuver exercises.  The goal being to 
create leaders that can choose the appropriate skill set to match the appropriate situation.  
What is being suggested is not unlike the difference between training chefs, who creates 
meals from a range of skills he learned, and short order cooks who prepare food 
according a prescriptive set of rules that ensure a uniform, but not necessarily satisfying 
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result, and the goal is to make combat arms leaders into chefs.  By creating chefs out of 
our leaders it will become easier to flatten the command structure, as chefs need less 
supervision than cooks.150  
To enhance trainings effectiveness increased realism needs to be integrated into 
the training system at all levels.  For example, why does the Marine Corps conduct ten 
combined arms exercises (CAX), regimental exercises replicating a Desert Storm type 
operation, a year, but does not conduct similar exercises that supports expeditionary 
operations such as amphibious landings or maritime prepositioning force operations.  Nor 
does the Marine Corps conduct any regimental combined arms exercise in jungle or 
mountainous terrain.151  Similarly, why does the Army invest a huge amount of resources 
into its Combat Training Centers (CTCs) only to make rotations a game?  In the Army 
the OpFor has a published TO/TE and doctrine.  The author’s experience with the Army 
Officer Basic and Career Courses is that they train TTPs that will be successful against 
the OpFor rather than skills that can be used regardless of the enemy and the 
environment.  This educational technique should create leaders proficient at the 
techniques required to defeat the OpFor, but does not create leaders able to choose skills 
necessary to defeat varied enemies in varied terrain.  In both cases the training has proven 
mostly effective, but only because our recent combat has centered in desert terrain.  
However, when operations were moved to an urban environment like that seen in 
Mogadishu or the mountains of eastern Afghanistan the training has proven to be less 
than adequate 
Conducting short notice CAX or CTC rotations would enhance realism.  These 
rotations also need to be against a unique enemy force in differing environments as most 
contingency operations are on short notice in difficult terrain, and against the least likely 
enemy.  To support this realism the OpFor TO/TE and doctrine should not be published.  
The days of templating the Soviet military is gone and should not be resurrected.  At the 
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151 MEU training/Bridgeport rotations (summer and winter) are all battalion level training.  
Regimental exercises that do occur are mainly conducted at the home station, which is not normally suited 
to true free play or live fire and maneuver exercises.  This leaves only desert training at CAX where Marine 
Corps units at the Regimental level train to employ all assets in a realistic environment. 
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small unit live fire and maneuver training supported by all anticipated fire support assets 
needs to become the predominant focus of training.  Brigade and battalion level training 
is needed, however, if small units are ill trained the battalion and brigade will be ill 
trained or spend an inordinate amount of time supervising subordinate units.  The result 
of ill-trained small units is decreased effectiveness throughout the force.   
Training the contemporary force for hybrid warfare entails leaving routinized 
training at the Recruit Depots, Officer Candidate Schools and Schools of Infantry.  Skills 
not techniques must be trained and leaders educated, and provided with extensive 
leadership experience in order to grow old prior to entering into combat with a hybrid 
force.  Many personnel issues, such as assignment policies, promotion policies, and 
recruiting policies will have to addressed in order to make this force a reality, but if the 
United States is to truly have what it claims to have, a professional volunteer force, 
quality and skill must be the dominant characteristics. 
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